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NOTES
THE LONG DISTANCE REMAND: FLORIDA V. BOSTICK AND
THE RE-AWAKENED BUS SEARCH BATTLEFRONT IN THE
WAR ON DRUGS
The War on Drugs has led to the development of innovative police
tactics' in much the same way that conventional wars have
produced technological and medical breakthroughs.2 To keep pace
with law enforcement, the Supreme Court has been scrambling to
set the boundaries of Fourth Amendment protection against
"unreasonable searches and seizures"3 in dozens of drug interdiction
cases.4 These cases have involved the entire run of Fourth Amend1. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209, 213-14 (1986) (detailing the story
ofthe industrious marijuana grower who hid his crop bybuildinga six-foot outer wall around
a ten-foot inner wall onlyto be thwarted by a police officer who secured the use of an airplane
to take aerialphotographs. The Court upheld the aerial surveillance and the search warrant
obtained on the basis of the photographs.); United States v. Badru, 97 F.3d 1471,1475 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (finding valid a consent to search obtained through the "Rolling No's" technique,
whereby the officer elicits a string of negative responses from a suspect before phrasing the
request to consent to a search in the negative, in this case, "You don't mind if we search your
car, do you?", to which the suspect answered "no").
2. E.g., MARTIN VAN CREVELD, TECHNOLOGY AND WAR (1989) (postulating that war
drives technological advances); cf Richard M. Garfield & Alfred I. Neugut, The Human
Consequences of War, in WARAND PUBLIC HEALTH 27 (Barry S. Levy & Victor W. Sidel eds.,
1997) (finding that war-related casualty levels are a function of evolving weaponry and
advances in health care).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment reads in full:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id.
4. The Courts last term showed no slowdown at the intersection of the Fourth
Amendment and the War on Drugs. See, e.g., Atwater v. City ofLago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, -,
121 S. Ct. 1536, 1557 (2001) (allowing searches incident to arrest when police stop a citizen
for a fine-only violation); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, -, 121 S. Ct. 1281,
1292-93 (2001) (holding that testing pregnant women for cocaine use without either consent
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ment issues, including what constitutes reasonable suspicion to6

conduct a search, 5 a traveler's reasonable expectation of privacy,
the extent of searches,7 asset forfeiture,' and standing.9
One popular tactic in the domestic theater of the drug war" is
drug-interdiction bus sweeps. The typical bus sweep scenario begins
with police officers boarding intercity buses at scheduled stops and
announcing themselves as officers searching for illegal narcotics, 1

or probable cause, and then turning the results over to police, constitutes an impermissible
search); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326,, 121 S. Ct. 946,950 (2001) (holding that police
may briefly prevent a person from reentering his home while a search warrant is being
prepared).
5. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000) (concluding that unprovoked flight
from police in a high crime area raises a reasonable suspicion to justify a police stop and
investigation of that person).
6. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337-39 (2000) (holding that an officer's
exploratory manipulation of a bus passengers bag violates a passenger's reasonable
expectation of privacy).
7. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999) (holding that the probable cause
established to search an automobile extends to the belongings of passengers and any other
containers large enough to contain the object of the search).
8. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 561,566 (1999) (upholdingthe Florida assetforfeiture
law that enables police to seize the automobile of an arrested drug dealer without a warrant
even though the dealer was not using the car at the time of his arrest and there is no
probable cause to otherwise search the vehicle).
9. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1998) (holding that because short-term
business visitors to an apartment have no legitimate expectation of privacy, they have no
standing under the Fourth Amendment to object to police observing them through drawn
window blinds).
10. The United States has expanded the drug war to many foreign fronts. "Drug
interdiction" has arguably become the magic word for foreign governments seeking military
aid from the United States. See, e.g., Pedro Ruz Gutierrez & E.A. Torriero, Military
Contractors Line Up for U.S. Drug War in Colombia, Cm. TREB., Sept. 24, 2000, at C5
(discussing U.S. backing of Colombia's war against drugs: $1.3 billion for the purchase and
operation of military helicopters and airplanes, and 500 active duty U.S. military personnel
to serve as trainers); Clifford Krauss, Pentagonto Help PeruStop Drug Traffic on Jungle
Rivers,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,1997, at A3 (announcing an agreement in which the United States
would support Peruvian drug interdiction efforts by providing military ships, aircraft,
communications gear, and personnel); Boonthan Sakanond, U.S. Bull in the Burma Ship,
Inter Press Serv., Apr. 22, 2001, availableatLEXIS, News Library (discussing the simulated
drug interdiction exercises involving 11,000 U.S. and Thai troops along the Thai-Burma
border and concluding that "the location of the exercise is clearly meant to send a message
to the generals in Rangoon"); Justin Sparks et al., East Europeans Angered by FBI
'Invasion," SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 2, 2000, at 33 (noting that plans to establish
FBI field offices in Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw, ostensibly to combat drug trafficking by
the Russian mafia, have been criticized as a continuation of the Cold War because the United
States is attempting to counteract the continuing influence of the KGB in those cities).
11. Sometimes officers cast their interdiction nets beyond illegal narcotics and announce
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and ends with either a generalized or passenger-by-passenger
request to conduct a consent search of the passengers' carry on
luggage. After years of conflicting opinions in lower courts, 12 in 1991
the Supreme Court addressed bus sweeps in Floridav. Bostick."3
Over a vigorous dissent by Justice Marshall, 1 the Court rejected
what it viewed as the Florida Supreme Court's per se rule
prohibiting bus sweeps15 and, in doing so, seemed to send the
message "that lower courts are expected not to interfere with bus
sweep procedures." 6 Although the Supreme Court chose to remand
the case for the application of its own analysis,1 7 the dire
pronouncements from commentators that the Court had chosen to
restrict citizens' Fourth Amendment protections in favor of the
government's interest in fighting the drug war18 were reflected in
lower court opinions throughout most of the 1990s. 9
that they are looking for multiple types ofcontraband. See, e.g., United States v. Guapi, 144
F.3d 1393, 1394 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting agent's announcement that he was checking carry
on luggage for "illegal contraband such as alcohol, narcotics, weapons, or explosives); United
States v. Manuel, 992 F.2d 272, 273 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing a situation in which an
agent asked a passenger "ifhe was carrying any weapons, large amounts of cash or illegal
drugs").
12. CompareUnited States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707,712 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that the
bus sweep procedure did not amount to a"seizure" of the bus), and United States v. Rembert,
694 F. Supp. 163, 176 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (same), with United States v. Felder, 732 F. Supp.
204,207-09 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that the police conducting the bus sweep had "seized" the
bus prior to questioning the accused).
13. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
14. Id. at 440-51.
15. Id. at 439-40.
16. Wayne I. LaFave, PinguitudinousPolice, PachydermatousPrey: Whence Fourth
Amendment "Seizures"?,1991 U. ILL L. REV. 729, 752; see also William R. O'Shields, Note,
The Exodus ofMinorities'FourthAmendment Rights into Oblivion: Florida v. Bostick and
the Merits ofAdopting a Per Se Rule Against Random, Suspicionless Bus Searches in the
Minority Community, 77 IOWAL. REv. 1875, 1889 (1992) ("As a result of the Courts decision
in Bostick, arbitrary intrusions into the lives of bus passengers are judicially condoned.").
17. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 440.
18. See Bruce A. Green, 'Power, Not Reason': Justice Marshall's Valedictory and the
Fourth Amendment in the Supreme Court's 1990 Term, 70 N.C. L. Rav. 373, 400 (1992)
(explaining the result in Bostick as "the Court's preference for the societal interest in having
suspects provide 'voluntary cooperation' to criminal investigators over the interest of
individuals in being free from coercive encounters with the police") (footnote omitted);
LaFave, supra note 16, at 752 (predicting that although "the optimistic side of [him] would
like to think" that a post-Bostick court could apply the reasoning of the decision and
"conclude that a bus passenger ... was seized ..., [he] doubt[s] this will be the case").
19. E.g., United States v. Manuel, 992 F.2d 272, 273-75 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that a
bus passenger accosted by police upon disembarking who had thrice refused to consent to a
search of a package demonstrated his knowledge that he could refuse consent, therefore
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After seven years of unremarkable application of the Supreme
Court's Bostick analysis, which invariably led to the admissibility
of evidence seized during bus sweeps, ° in 1998 the Eleventh Circuit
in United States v. Guapi2" fired the first salvo in a renewed
skirmish over bus sweeps. By applying the Court's Bostick analysis
to a routine bus sweep, but finding that an impermissible seizure
had occurred,' the Eleventh Circuit touched off a powderkeg of
tension that had lain dormant for several years.
This Note first tracks the Supreme Court's development of the
consent search exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement and then discusses the exceptions used in the context
of bus sweeps.' The detailed treatment given to the procedural
history of Terry Bostick's case before and after the Supreme Court's
decision serves to illustrate the complexity of the constitutional
questions posed by bus sweeps. This part contends that the
polarization between the majority and dissenting opinions in
Bostick was unnecessary and served to stunt a nuanced
development of bus-sweep jurisprudence. Further, this part argues
that rather than disparaging the majority opinion of Bostick as
granting the police carte blanche in conducting bus sweeps, civil
libertarians should embrace the opinion as opening a second avenue
by which defendants can suppress evidence seized during bus
sweeps. This section then analyzes the Eleventh Circuit's application of Bostick to a series of recent bus sweep cases and outlines
the circuit split that has developed concerning the tactic.'

indicating that the consent given in response to a fourth request to search his person was not
coerced, but voluntary); United States v. Gonzales, 979 F.2d 711, 712-13 (9th Cir. 1992)
(upholding Border Patrol drug interdiction procedure in which an officer would board a bus
and conduct consent searches while the bus was in motion because "[tihe boarding ofthe bus
did not affect the ability of... passengers to ignore the officer and go about their business,
which at the moment was to ride down the street!).
20. E.g., United States v. Wright, No. 96-4415,1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1254 (4th Cir. Jan.
27, 1997) (per curiam); United States v. Phillips, No. 94-5113, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 9541
(4th Cir. Apr. 26, 1995) (per curiam); United States v. Rivera, No. 93-3077, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2411 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25,1995) (per curiam); United States v. Hammond, No. 92-3174,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 23048 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 27,1993) (per curiam); Gonzales, 979 F.2d 711.
21. 144 F.3d 1393 (11th Cir. 1998).
22. Id. at 1397.
23. See infra notes 27-86 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 87-141 and accompanying text.
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The next part examines the psychological backdrop of bus sweeps
and argues that an inquiry into psychological coercion forms the
fabric of the Supreme Court's Bostick standards.' To determine
whether a police-passenger encounter was consensual and whether
a passenger's consent to search was given voluntarily, then,
requires courts to ascertain whether the initial encounter or the
consent to search was the result of impermissible psychological
coercion by the police. This part identifies three psychological
theories which should inform courts in examining bus sweeps and
applies the theories to the Eleventh Circuit's recent bus-sweep
the Eleventh Circuit's application
decisions. The analysis supports
26
of the Bostick standards.
THE LEGAL ANALYSIS

The Approach
In protecting "[the right of the people to be secure ... against

unreasonable searches and seizures,"' the Supreme Court has
developed three broad categorizations of the "protean variety of...
encounter[s]" 28 between citizens and police. Searches conducted
pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate and supported by
probable cause are the traditional searches contemplated by the
text of the Fourth Amendment. 29 The second category, brief stop25. See infra notes 143.60 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 161-241 and accompanying text.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
28. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968).
29. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("[Slearches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by ajudge ormagistrate, areperseunreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.") (footnotes omitted). In addition to the consent and stop-and-frisk
exceptions to the probable cause-backed warrant requirement discussed in this Note, the
Supreme Court has recognized at least four other excepted searches: those made (1) incident
to arrest; (2) pursuant to the "hot pursuit" doctrine; (3) pursuant to the "plainview" doctrine;
(4) under "exigent circumstances." Jacqueline J. Warner, The Exigent Circumstance
Exception to the WarrantRequirementof the FourthAmendment: What CriteriaMust Be
Met?, 33 How. L. J. 425,425 n.3 (1991). With at least six exceptions to the original text, one
is reminded of Edwin Meese II's warning that an awareness of "the necessary distinction
between the Constitution and constitutional law ... is essential to maintaining our limited
form of government." Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution,61TUL. L. REV. 979,981
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and-frisk detentions and searches based on an officer's reasonable
and articulable suspicion of a crime, are considered "seizures" of
citizens under the Fourth Amendment and therefore trigger its
protection. If a court finds that a suspect's arrest or stop-and-frisk
detention was an improperly supported seizure, the evidence
discovered as a result of the search will not be admissible at trial."
The third category involves mere encounters between police and
citizens during which an officer is free to approach a citizen and the
citizen is likewise free to engage the officer or ignore him
altogether.32 Incident to such a consensual encounter, an officer is
free to ask the citizen for consent to search the citizen's person or
belongings and, again, the citizen is free to grant or deny consent to
the search. 3 "[A]s long as the police do not convey a message that
compliance with their requests is required,"3 these encounters are
not seizures and do not implicate the Fourth Amendment."
Evidence obtained as a result of a citizen's voluntary consent to
search is admissible in court.36
Since the Supreme Court addressed the Fourth Amendment
implications of bus sweeps in 1991, the federal courts of appeal
have adopted a common methodology for analyzing this drug

(1987).
30. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-19; City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000)
(declining to find a public safety exception to the reasonable suspicion standard and holding
that brief, suspicionless roadblocks with the primary purpose of drug interdiction constitute
impermissible seizures under the Fourth Amendment).
31. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,655 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to criminal
trials in state courts and thereby setting the minimum threshold of Fourth Amendment
protections in all search and seizure cases).
32. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 576 (1988) (concluding that no seizure takes
place as long as a citizen is "free to disregard the police presence and go about his business").
33. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983) (plurality opinion).
34. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,435 (1991).
35. Id. at 434.
36. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497:
[Liaw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely
approaching an individual on the street or another public place, by asking him
if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the
person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution
his voluntary answers to such questions.
The Court went on to remark that evidence found during a search to which one voluntarily
consented would be admissible. Id. at 501.
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interdiction tactic.3" By definition, bus sweeps are random
encounters-conducted without reasonable suspicion-that make
a Terry-based intrusion on passengers. 8 Accordingly, a search
conducted during a bus sweep must be grounded in the passenger's
consent to the search. To establish valid consent, the government
must first prove that the bus-sweep procedure in question did not
constitute a "seizure," the test being "whether a passenger who is
approached during a sweep 'would feel free to decline the officers'
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." 9 Second, if the onbus encounter is not a "seizure," the prosecution must show that,
taking all the surrounding circumstances into account, the consent
to search was voluntarily given and was not the product of police
coercion. 40 If a court finds that the consent given was the result of
police coercion, then the consent is invalid and any evidence
discovered will be inadmissible as the product of an unreasonable
search.41 Though it is a relevant factor in the analysis, a suspect
37. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
38. Police have often tried to justify the bus sweep tactic by claiming that they target
buses emanating from police-defined "source cities" of narcotics. Standing alone, the "source
city" factor does not rise to the level ofreasonable suspicion, but it appears to be relevant to
some courts. See United States v. Smith, 201 F.3d 1317,1323 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding abus's
departure from the "source city" of Miami to be "not an insignificant factor" creating a
reasonable suspicion for officers to search a suspect) (quoting United States v. Bowles, 625
F.2d 526,534 (5th Cir. 1980)); United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(including New York as one of the "drug-source cities" from which bus passengers were
interviewed); United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 708 (4th Cir. 1990) (claiming that
"Detroitwas known by [the arresting officer] to be a source city for narcotics"). Also, Justice
Marshall noted a possible racial component ofbus sweeps by suggesting officers pressed for
time may be more likely to single out blacks for questioning. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 442 n.1
(uMhe basis of the decision to single out passengers during a suspicionless sweep is less
likely to be inarticulablethan unspeakable.");see also Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil
Eye and an Unequal Hand.Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling,74
TuL. L. REV.1409, 1462 (2000) ("Police hunches in drug interdiction all too often reduce to
racial stereotypes, and consent is extracted from those who historically have had the most
to fear from refusing police requests.").
39. Bostiek, 501 U.S. at 444 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In agreeing that this is the
appropriate "seizure" test, the dissent made this standard unanimous.
40. Id. at 438 ('Consent' that is the product of official intimidation or harassment is not
consent at all."); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980) (explaining
in the context of an encounter in an airport which led to a consent search that "[tihe question
whether the [suspect's] consent ...
was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or
coercion, express or implied, is to be determined by the totality of all the circumstances ...
and is a matter which the government has the burden of proving").
41. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233 (1973).
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does not have to know that he has the right to refuse consent for a
court to determine that the consent was nonetheless "voluntary."42
The bus sweep tactic of drug interdiction dates to the early
1980s.' As with many innovations within law enforcement or
elsewhere, the nuances of bus sweeps came into focus only after
several years' experience with the tactic. After roughly eight years
of lower court treatment, the Supreme Court, in its 1991 Bostick
opinion, set the standards for analyzing bus sweeps under the
Fourth Amendment. In the wake of Bostick, the federal courts of
appeal moved cautiously, arriving at a consensus on methodology
for applying the Bostick standards and invariably finding no
constitutional violations. However, seven years after Bostick and
nearly two decades after bus sweeps came into being, the Eleventh
Circuit, guided by the Supreme Court's standards and supported by
the methodological consensus, gave nuanced treatments to a series
of bus sweep cases, finding Fourth Amendment violations in each.
The subtle clarity of the Eleventh Circuit's vision is best
appreciated through a thorough review of the historical trajectory
of bus sweep jurisprudence.
Floridav. Bostick
During a scheduled stopover in Ft. Lauderdale, the bus on
which Terry Bostick was riding from Miami to Atlanta was the
42. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 432 (finding the fact that Bostick had been informed that he
could refuse consent to be "particularly worth noting"); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 249 (noting
that "while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account,
the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to
establishing a voluntary consent"). For a critique of the Court's reasoning allowing
uninformed consent, see Tracey Macin, Justice Thurgood Marshal" Taking the Fourth
Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REv.723, 792-95 (1992).
43. Apparently, the bus sweep technique was developed in Broward County, Florida. See
Kenneth W. Starr, Oral Argument on Behalf of the United States as Amicus Curiae, 1991
U.S. Trans. LEXIS 156, *16*17, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). The fact that
Solicitor General Starr appeared before the United States Supreme Court to support the
State of Florida in Bostick is not surprising as the bus sweep tactic was created in the wake
of President Reagan's declaration of the War on Drugs in the fall of 1982. See President
Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation (Oct. 2,1982), in 18WEEKLYCOMP. PRES. DoC.
1249,1250 ("The mood towards drugs is changing in this country, and the momentum is with
us. We're making no excuses for drugs-hard, soft, or otherwise. Drugs are bad, and we're
going after them.").
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site of a random bus sweep conducted by two Broward County
sheriff's deputies." "[Clomplete with badges, insignia and one of
them holding a recognizable zipper pouch, containing a pistol," the
officers approached Bostick and asked to see his ticket and
identification.4 5 After the documents were returned to Bostick as
"unremarkable," the officers explained that they were on a drug
interdiction assignment and asked Bostick to consent to a search of
his carry on luggage.46 Bostick claimed that he had not consented
to the subsequent search which revealed cocaine, but the trial judge
found that the bus sweep did not amount to a "seizure" and that
Bostick had consented to the search.4 7
Bostick's petition for a rehearing of the facts was denied, but
while affirming the trial court's decision, the Florida appeals court
certified the question of the legality of consent search bus sweeps
to the Florida Supreme Court.' In granting review of the
44. Bostickv. State, 510 So. 2d. 321,322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (Letts, J., dissenting).
45. I& (footnote omitted).
46. Id.
47. Id. ("Inherently, the trial judge's [denial ofthe motion to suppress] was tantamount
to a holding that a consensual police encounter took place rather than an illegal intrusion
equivalent to a seizure."). Bostick's contention that he did not consent to the search was a
question of fact decided in the State's favor by the trial judge. I&
48. Id. at 322. In effect, the certified question was a modified version ofBostick's motion
to suppress the cocaine. Notably, the question certified to the Florida Supreme Court
encompassed both the seizure and the consent to search. It read: "May the police without
articulable suspicion board a bus and ask at random, for, and receive, consent to search a
passenger's luggage where they advise the passenger that he has the right to refuse consent
to search?" Id
The lone dissent from the per curiam decision was vehement in answering the certified
question in the negative. Judge Letts presciently applied the Chestnut"free to leave" test,
later recrafted by the Supreme Court as a "free to decline the officer's requests" test, to find
that Bostick was seized by the deputies:
EMly version of common sense tells me that a paid and ticketed passenger will
not voluntarily forfeit his destination and get up and exit a bus in the middle
of his journey, during a temporary stopover, while two policemen, one with a
pouched gun in his hand, are standing over him in a narrow aisle asking him
questions and requesting permission to search his luggage. It is not a question
of whether he actually was free to leave, as all of us trained lawyers know he
was. The test is whether a layman would reasonably be expected to believe he
was free to leave under these circumstances. I conclude he would not.
My having decided that the defendant was not free to leave, it follows that
the police questioning under the facts of this case constituted an illegal
detention and seizure.
Id. at 323.
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procedure, the Florida Supreme Court rephrased the certified
question to focus entirely on the prerequest seizure analysis,
effectively reading the voluntariness of a passenger's consent out
of the equation. 49 The court, weighing all of the circumstances
surrounding the bus sweep, "ha[d] no doubt that the Sheriff's
Department's standard procedure of 'working the buses' is an
investigative practice implicating the protections against unreasonable seizures of the person."" The court realized that its per
se prohibition of bus sweeps would hamper drug interdiction efforts
to a degree, but nonetheless reasoned that "It]he intrusion upon
privacy rights caused by the ... policy [was] too great for a

democracy to sustain.""' Due to a change in the Florida Constitution

49. As rephrased by the Florida Supreme Court, the certified question read: "Does an
impermissible seizure result when police mount a drug search on buses during scheduled
stops and question boarded passengers without articulable reasons for doing so, thereby
obtaining consent to search the passengers' luggage?" Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153,1154
(Fla. 1989). This rephrasing is significant because it implicitly accepts that Bostick's consent
to search was given voluntarily. As evidenced by the district court's emphasis on the fact that
the deputies had advised Bostick that he could refuse to grant consent to search, the consent
question had not been settled. See supra note 40. In foreclosing the consent to search issue,
the Florida Supreme Court decided to decide too little; in doing so it decided too much. Its
decision to change the certified question paved the way for its per se ruling that all bus
sweeps are seizures. Determining that the deputies did not have a reasonable suspicion to
believe that Bostick was engaging in an illegal activity, the court ended its inquiry. Bostick,
554 So. 2d at 1158. The consent to search analysis was neverreached except forthe formality
of concluding that Bostick's consent to search never "overcame the taint of the illegal police
conduct." Id
50. Id. at 1156. In determining that Bostick had been "seized," the court noted the
restraining setting ofa bus and the "'veryintimidating" actions of the officers including that
they wore raid jackets, stood over Bostick, blocked the aisle, and that one carried a
recognizable gun pouch in his hand. Id. at 1157-58.
51. Id. at 1158. The court continued with a flourish:
Without doubt the inherently transient nature of drug courier activity presents
difficult law enforcement problems. Roving patrols, random sweeps, and
arbitrary searches or seizures would go farto eliminate such crime in this state.
Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Communist Cuba have demonstrated all too
tellingly the effectiveness of such methods. Yet we are not a state that
subscribes to the notion that ends justify means. History demonstrates that the
adoption of repressive measures, even to eliminate a clear evil, usually results
only in repression more mindless and terrifying than the evil that prompted
them. Means have a disturbing tendency to become the end result.
Id. at 1158-59.
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afew years earlier, however, Terry Bostick's third court appearance
would be far from his last. 2 The State of Florida appealed the
52. That the decision of the Florida Supreme Courtwas appealable to the U.S. Supreme
Court may have been the unkindest cut of all for Terry Bostick. Prior to a 1982 amendment
to the Florida Constitution, the language of its Article 1, Section 12 was in substance
identical to that ofthe Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. That these search and
seizure provisions read the same, however, did not mean that they were interpreted
identically by the respective high courts. The United States Supreme Court had determined
that the federal Constitution establishes only the minimum level ofindividual liberties states
must accord their citizens and that states are encouraged to interpret analogous provisions
in their own constitutions to grant citizens broader protections. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robbins, 447 U.S. 74,81 (1980); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the
ProtectionofIndividualRights,90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) ("[S]tate courts cannot rest
when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond
those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law."). In 1982, Article I,
Section 12 of the Florida Constitution was amended to include provisions that the State's
search and seizure protections "shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment
to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court" and
that evidence gathered in violation of the right would not be admissible in court "if such
articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme
Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution." FLA. CONST. of
1968, art. I § 12 (amended 1982). Prior to the 1982 amendment, the Florida Supreme Court's
decision prohibiting bus sweeps would not have been appealable to the United States
Supreme Court and would have become the law in Florida, subject only to new constitutional
amendment explicitly authorizing the technique or a subsequent decision by the Florida
Supreme Court overturning the per se rule.
In a bus sweep case coming on the heels of the Supreme Court's Bostick decision, and
again involving the Broward County Sheriffs Department, a Florida appeals court chief
judge bemoaned the fact that his hands were tied in having to overturn a motion to suppress
granted by the trial court prior to the United States Supreme Court's Bostick decision: "We
Floridians, however, because of a constitutional amendment in 1982, abandoned any claim
we might have for self-determination in Fourth Amendment cases by voting to add limiting
language to our then inviolate section 12 of our Declaration of Rights .... " State v.
Kuntzwiler, 585 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (Glickstein, C.J., concurring).
The chief judge later added that "the decision was immensely unwise; and the subsequent
majority decision of the United States Supreme Court [in Bostick] ... gutting the "Per Se"
rule, proves my point-at least to me." Id. at 1098.
By contrast, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania operates exactly as Chief Judge
Glickstein envisioned. Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution mirrors that of
the Fourth Amendment. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has interpreted its
"search and seizure" protections to be broader than that of the Federal Constitution. E.g.,
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894-95 (Pa. 1991) (discussing and emphasizing
factors to be considered in analyzing Pennsylvania's constitution and noting that states are
permitted and indeed encouraged to provide broader protections than the federal
government). In a bus sweep in which the officers' conduct reflected their"aware[ness] of the
need to maintain a non-coercive atmosphere," and the facts ofwhich were demonstrably less
intimidating than those that ensnared Terry Bostick, a Pennsylvania appeals court held that
officers conducting bus sweeps in effect "seize the bus" and only a finding that a reasonable
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ruling, and the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the
case during its 1991 Term.53
Writing for the six-Justice majority, Justice O'Connor noted early
in her decision that the Florida Supreme Court had "rephrased and
answered the certified question so as to make the bus setting
dispositive in every case." 4 O'Connor correctly recognized that by
answering the rephrased question in the affirmative, "[t]he Florida
Supreme Court thus adopted a per se rule that the ...
practice of

'working the buses' is unconstitutional."55 Justice Marshall, writing
for the dissent, took a different view of the Florida Supreme Court's
decision by characterizing it not as a per se rule, but as a decision
which "drew heavily" on the facts established by the district court.'
Whereas the majority read the certified question on its face,57
Justice Marshall incorporated the underlying facts into his analysis
of the question presented.5"
Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion was entirely
consistent with their respective framings of the issue. The majority
cast the issue as necessitating a narrow analysis of whether the
deputies seized Bostick but later reanimated the consent analysis,
thus allowing a flexible, more encompassing application sensitive
to all of the circumstances surrounding particular bus sweep
procedures.59 The dissent viewed its analysis as resting on factual
premises, but in fact did want a strict per se rule prohibiting bus
60
sweeps.

suspicion existed will support such a search. Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 703 A.2d 25,28,32
(Pa. Super. 1997).
53. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).

54. Id. at 433.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 445-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. The majority viewed the "sole issue presented" to be a determination ofwhether the
bus sweep procedure at issue 'necessarily constitutes a 'seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 433.
58. Justice Marshall chastised the majority for "treat[ing as irrelevant the analysis of
facts that the parties neglected to cram into the question presented in the petition for
certiorari." Id at 446 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
60. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 444 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disagreeingwiththe majority's
suggestion that "the suspicionless, dragnet-style sweep of buses ...
is perfectly compatible
with the Constitution").
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In analyzing the initial on-bus encounter, the Court analogized
bus sweeps to the random INS factory checks for illegal aliens at
issue in INS v. Delgado."'Just as the workers in Delgadomay have
felt confined to stay at their work stations due to their "voluntary
obligations to their employers" and were not restricted by the
actions of INS agents,62 the Court reasoned that Bostick's claimed
sense of being confined "was the natural result of his decision to
take the bus" and that "it says nothing about whether or not
the police conduct at issue was coercive." 3 The Court did not
decide whether the initial encounter constituted an impermissible
"seizure" of Bostick; rather it advised the Florida Supreme Court to
answer the question taking into account all of the circumstances of
the encounter. 6 ' If the deputies' conduct was such that a reasonable
person would not have felt free to ignore their presence, Bostick
would have been considered impermissibly "seized" under the
Fourth Amendment.65 The Court was not explicit on the point, but
presumably the fact that the encounter took place in the confined
space of a bus remained a relevant factor."
61. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
62. Id. at 218.
63. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436. The majority's analysis, focused on the actions of the
officers, might have been different had the deputies waited for Bostick to reboard the bus at
the end of a lengthy stopover before initiating the encounter, thus taking advantage of the
setting. This sweep, however, took place during a brief stop and "through"passengers did not
have time to exit the bus during the stopover. See id. at 435-36.
64. Id. at 437.
65. Id. (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)).
66. This Note does not argue that the Supreme Court wrongly decided Bostick. Rather,
it contends that whether police notify passengers that they can refuse to engage in an on-bus
encounter and deny a search request is a particularly important consideration for courts
analyzing bus sweeps, and that such an approach is consistent with Bostick. See id. at 432,
433 (identifying the "sole issue presented for ...
review" whether the bus sweep "necessarily
constituteld] a 'seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and finding it
.particularly worth noting ...
[that] police specifically advised Bostick that he had a right to
refuse consent") (emphasis added).
At the initial encounter stage, for instance, Miranda-like warnings would serve as a bridge
between the "free to leave" principle of Chesternutand the "free to terminate the encounter"
standard the Court set in Bostick. That is, whereas Miranda-like warnings may not be
necessary in dynamic open settings where courts can weigh a greater range of objective
criteria in determining whether a reasonable person would have felt "free to leave," in static
bus sweep scenarios, Miranda-like warnings are the best way for police to compensate for
passengers "confined" on a bus. Therefore, the absence of warnings is a strong indication to
courts that a reasonable passenger would not have felt "free to terminate the encounter" with
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The Court could have remanded the case at the point it
established the standard for determining whether the initial on-bus
encounter constituted a "seizure," but to its credit the Court revived
the analysis concerningthe voluntariness of the consent to search. 7
It is this second question that the Florida Supreme Court had
eliminated in its rephrasing of the certified question from the
district court.6" Citing Floridav. Royer69 and other consent search
cases, Justice O'Connor again determined that "all the circumstances surrounding the encounter"70 should be weighed, having
earlier stressed the lower court finding that "the police specifically
advised Bostick that he had the right to refuse consent."71
Significantly, here the Court made explicit the importance of the
bus setting: "The cramped confines of a bus are one relevant factor
that should be considered in evaluating whether a passenger's
consent is voluntary."72 Taken as a whole, the majority's position,
though decried by the dissent as sacrificing citizens' liberty
interests in favor of facilitating the drug war,7" provided ample
opportunity for the Florida Supreme Court to find that Bostick
either had been impermissibly seized by the deputies at the initial
encounter stage of the interdiction or that his consent to the search
was not voluntary, but rather was the product of police coercion.
This seriatim approach gave Bostick two bites at the apple-even
if the Florida Supreme Court determined that the initial on-bus
encounter was consensual, Bostick's motion to suppress would still
police.

67. See id. at 438. The majority noted that "a bus passenger's decision to cooperate with
law enforcement officers authorizes the police to conduct a search without first obtaining a
warrant only if the cooperation is voluntary." Id.
68. See supranotes 48-49 and accompanying text.
69. 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion). Royer captured in a single sentence the
seriatim approach courts must take by analyzing first whether an initial police-citizen
encounter was consensual, then whether the consent to search was granted voluntarily: "[IWf
the events in this case amounted to no more than a permissible police encounter in a public
place or a justifiable Terry-type detention, Royer's consent, if voluntary, would have been
effective to legalize the search of his two suitcases." Id. at 501.
70. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439.
71. Id. at 432.
72. Id. at 439.
73. See id. at 440 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Our Nation, we are told, is engaged in a'war

on drugs.' ... But the effectiveness of a law-enforcement technique is not proof of its
constitutionality.").
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be granted if his subsequent consent to the search was found to be
the involuntary product of police coercion.
The dissent criticized the majority for reaching the voluntariness
of the consent to search issue, the discussion of which would have
been obviated had the majority found an impermissible seizure at
the initial encounter stage.74 To Justice Marshall, "the issue [was]
not whether a passenger in respondent's position would have felt
free to deny consent to the search of his bag, but whether such a
passenger ... would have felt free to terminate the antecedent

encounter with the police."75 The Florida Supreme Court had
unwisely foreclosed the consent to search question in rephrasing the
certified question, and the dissent here is similarly guilty of
stunting a full analysis of both issues. The dissent neglected the
possibility that the majority opinion, while rejecting the per se rule
that under the Fourth Amendment officers may never approach
citizens on buses for the purpose of conducting consent searches,
left the constitutionality of the initial encounter open to a case-bycase determination and reanimated the possibility of invalidating
the on-bus search by finding coerced consent. Focusing solely on the
initial encounter, the dissent hypothesized that police could avoid
a determination that they had illegally seized a passenger if the
officers first advised those confronted that they could decline to be
questioned.76 By obviating the need to reach the voluntariness of
the consent to search analysis, Justice Marshall missed the
opportunity to instruct courts that they could grant a motion to
suppress based on the latter half of the two-stage analysis.
On remand, the question put to the Florida Supreme Court was
"whether Bostick chose to permit the search of his luggage."77
Answering the remanded question required the Florida Supreme
Court to first apply Justice O'Connor's adapted "free to leave" test
to evaluate the permissibility of the initial on-bus encounter. Only
if it found the initial encounter to have been consensual would the
74. See 1d. at 447 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the voluntariness question
"[was] completely irrelevant ... if [Bostick] was unlawfully seized when the officers
approached him and initiated questioning").
75. Id. at 447 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 450 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 438.
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Florida Supreme Court have had to confront "stage two," the
voluntariness of the consent to search. A finding that Bostick
voluntarily consented to the search of his luggage at this second
stage of the analysis would mean that the search was allowable
under the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, the two-stage analysis offered two opportunities for the
Florida Supreme Court to grant Bostick's motion to suppress. First,
if on remand the court found that police conduct at the initial
encounter stage was such that Bostick could not reasonably have
felt at liberty to decline or end the encounter with police, Bostick
would have been considered impermissibly "seized" at that point
and his motion to suppress the evidence found in the subsequent
search would be granted. This "seizure" determination would have
obviated the need to determine whether the consent to search was
voluntary. If, however, the initial encounter between Bostick and
the deputies was found to be consensual, the court would then have
had to determine whether Bostick's consent to search was given
voluntarily. This is the second bite at the apple. If the Florida
Supreme Court had applied Justice O'Connor's analysis and,
considering the totality of the circumstances, found that Bostick's
consent to the search was coerced, his motion to suppress would
have been granted at this stage. The Florida Supreme Court would
have been forced away from its per se rule only slightly.7"
Further illustrating the closeness of the constitutional questions
posed by the bus-sweep tactic, a change in the composition of the
Florida Supreme Court appears to have swung the balance against
Mr. Bostick.79 In the two years since Bostick's first appearance
before the Florida Supreme Court, Chief Judge Ehrlich, who had
been in the majority that established the per se rule prohibiting bus
sweeps, had left the court.80 His replacement, Judge Harding, joined
by the original three dissenting judges, voted to deny Bostick's
78. The result could have been a rule akin to a rebuttable presumption that policeinitiated encounters on buses constitute seizures, or alternatively, that the procedure and
confines of a bus are so inherently coercive that defendants would be granted a rebuttable
presumption that the consent to search was involuntary.
79. That Bostick's fate turned on a personnel change on the Florida Supreme Court also
furthered his incredible run of bad legal luck that began with the change in the Florida
Constitution. See supranote 52 and accompanying text.
80. Bostick v. State, 593 So. 2d 494, 495 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam).
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motion to suppress. 8 The three judges who had joined Chief Judge
Ehrlich two years earlier comprised the dissent on remand. 2
The four-judge majority, on remand, inexplicably abdicated its
responsibility to apply the tests laid out by the Supreme Court and,
in what was essentially a one-line per curiam opinion devoid of any
analysis, approved the district court's denial of Bostick's motion to
suppress lodged five years earlier.8" Judge Barkett, the author of
the majority opinion two years earlier, acknowledged the Supreme
Court's rejection of his per se rule, but nonetheless dissented. 4 He
applied the totality of the circumstances test as dictated by the
Supreme Court and found that, "under the specific facts of this
case," Bostick had been illegally seized before he consented to the
search. 5 Judge Barkett's analysis indicated that the dissent indeed
viewed the Supreme Court's opinion as calling for a seriatim
approach and that a motion to suppress could succeed at either the
initial encounter or request to search stage."
The Eleventh Circuit
The Supreme Court's decision inBostick precipitated a lull on the
bus-sweep front of the drug war as the few reported federal circuit
court cases found the encounters to be permissible nonseizures and
the consents to search voluntary.8" To the degree that anything can
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. Afer aterse recitation ofthe proceduralhistory ofthe case, the majority rendered
its decision. It read in full: "In light of the Supreme Court's opinion, we now approve the
decision of the district court." Id.
84. Id. at 496 (Barkett, J., dissenting) ("I am mindful that under certain circumstances,
a reasonable person may feel free to terminate an encounter with the police when confronted
in the confines of a bus, but I do not find those circumstances to exist here.").
85. Id. at 495 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). Factors that indicated to the
dissent that Bostick had been seized included: (1) the presence of multiple officers wearing
jackets bearing the insignia of their department; (2) that the officers proceeded directly to
Bostick at the rear of the bus; (3) the recognizable gun pouch one deputy carried; (4) that the
officers blocked the aisle; and (5) the persistent questioning of the deputies. Id.
86. See id. (Barkett,J., dissenting) (notingthatareasonable personinBostick's situation
"would not have felt free to ignore the police or to decline to consent to a search") (emphasis
added). This language is similar to that of the "initial encountee test of Bostick, but clearly
bifircates the analysis into "initial encounter" and "consent to search" components.
87. See supranote 20 and accompanying text. In contrast, the years leading up toBostick
produced many lengthy and often rancorous opinions concerning the bus sweep tactic. E.g.,
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be read into the fact that many of these opinions were unpublished,
one may suspect that denials of motions to suppress in bus sweep
cases had become pro forma. This lack of analysis can be traced
through the one-line opinion by the Florida Supreme Court majority
on remand to Justice Marshall's dissent."8 Both of these opinions
failed to acknowledge that Justice O'Connor's decision, though it
vacated Florida's per se rule, in fact created a seriatim approach
offering suspects caught in bus sweeps two opportunities to
suppress evidence found during the sweeps.8 9 A suspect could either
show that he was impermissibly seized at the initial encounter
stage or he could prove that his consent to search was involuntarily
coerced. On remand, the Florida Supreme Court's dissent was
methodologically instructive, though drowned out by the majority's

United States v. Madison, 936 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294
(D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Fields, 909 F.2d 470 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hammock, 860 F.2d 390 (11th Cir.
1988).
88. Early in his dissent, Justice Marshall lamented that he "[could] not understand how
the majority could possibly suggest an affriative answer" to the question of whether a
passenger in Bostick's position -would feel free to ...
terminate the encounter" with police.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 44445 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The conclusiveness
of this statement seemed to deflect Justice Marshall's reasoning away from a fuller
consideration of the majority's two part analysis. Instead of focusing solely on the initial
encounter, the dissent's opinion would have been more instructive-not to mention
encouraging to lower courts disposed to finding bus sweep procedures violative ofthe Fourth
Amendment-had it applied the voluntariness test to the circumstances surrounding
Bostick's granting of consent to search and found that consent to have been the involuntary
product of police coercion.
89. In his defense, Justice Marshall may have notedthe majority's two stages ofanalysis,
but simply decided the case by finding that Terry Bostick had been impermissibly seized at
the initial encounter stage. In any event, the Florida Supreme Court majority on remand
deserves the lion's share of the blame because it failed to apply any ofthe analysis supplied
by Justice O'Connor. With its one-line opinion, the majority abdicated its "duty of
responsiveness" that the "[wiriting [of] judicial opinions imposes on the writer," and seemed
to stunt not only its own deliberative judgment, but also that of courts in subsequent bus
sweep cases. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 330 (1993); see also GEORGE
WYTHE, DECISIONS INCASES IN VIRGINIA BYTHE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 88 (1795), quoted
in IMOGENE E. BROWN, AMERICAN ARISTIDES 263 (1981) (commenting sarcastically on the
"mature deliberation" of a court of appeals that dismissed his "lengthy, meticulously defined,
decision in one sentence with no explanation": "This specimen of refutation seemeth not less
happy than compendious. 1, it is economical, for by it are saved the expenses of time and
labour requisite, in a dialectic investigation, which is sometimes perplexed with stubborn
difficulties.").
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summary disposal of the case."0 Its value lay in fleshing out the
seriatim approach indicated by Justice O'Connor and in showing
that if one applies the analysis, the constitutionality of a bus sweep
is an open question.
Even though the post-Bostick courts reached the same result in
bus sweep cases, the few detailed opinions were significant in that,
like the Florida Supreme Court dissenters in the Bostick remand,
they employed a seriatim approach by analyzing the initial
encounter and then the request to search as separate issues. 91 A
series of recent decisions by the Eleventh Circuit, however, has
reinvigorated the debate over the bus sweep technique for
interdicting drugs. 92 In these cases, the Eleventh Circuit has
cemented the view that the Supreme Court in Bostick indicated
that the initial encounter and the consent to search call for distinct
analyses. More radically, the Eleventh Circuit has applied the
Supreme Court's tests to routine bus sweeps and has concluded that
the encounter was either an illegal seizure or that the consent to
search had not been given voluntarily, but rather was the result of
police coercion. Motions to suppress have been granted at both
stages.
In UnitedStates v. Guapi,9 the Eleventh Circuit determined that
considering all of "the circumstances in which the consent was
obtained, [the defendant's consent] was not an uncoerced, voluntary
90. The Florida Supreme Court's one-line reinstatement of the trial court's denial of
Bostick's motion to suppress may be explained best by game theory. See MICHAEL J.
GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 85 (2000) (describing the game of tit-fortat as a"series ofperiods in which one player tries to cooperate while the other is retaliating
for wrong done in a previous period") (citation omitted). The new majority may have been
retaliating against the original majority's rephrasing of the certified question two years
earlier which, when answered affirmatively, was dispositive in all bus sweep cases. Now
holding the upper hand, the new majority asserted its power in a similarly conclusory
manner.

91. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 979 F.2d 711,712-15 (9th Cir. 1992) (considering
separately whether "the Constitution permitted the border patrol agent to speak with
Gonzales" and whether a "request to a passenger's baggage in a routine bus sweep is
permitted by the Constitution"); see also In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497, 504 (D.C. 1992) (holding
that the initial on-bus encounter was not a seizure, but remanding on the consent to search
issue).
92. See United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Smith,
201 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393 (11th Cir. 1998).
93. 144 F.3d 1393 (11th Cir. 1998).
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consent as is required to validate such a warrantless search."94
Writing for the unanimous court, Judge Roney reasoned that
under the circumstances of the case, "a reasonable person in the
defendant's position would not have felt free to disregard [the
officer's] requests- without some positive indication that consent
could have been refused."95 Central to this finding was the bus
setting,96 the behavior of the police given the setting,97 and that,
unlike inBostick, the police here did not advise the passengers that
they could decline the search.98 The court was not willing to create
a per se rule that a bus sweep absent notification to passengers of
the right to refuse a search request necessarily taints the search,
but it remarked that the notice is an "important factor."99 Looking
to other factors surrounding the encounter, the court noted four
additional circumstances which pointed to the court's conclusion
that the search was "constitutionally unreasonable.""° Each of
94. Id. at 1393.
95. Id. at 1395.
96. Id. (As this case graphically illustrates, the cramped confines of a bus create an
environment uniquely susceptible to coercive police tactics.").
97. Id. (finding that rather than merely avoiding "egregiously abusive police tactics," the
police have an affinmative duty to "behave in a manner calculated to convey to a reasonable
person that cooperation with law enforcement is voluntary").
98. Id.
99. Id. The courtcontinued:"Providing a simple notification to bus passengers is perhaps
the most efficient and effective method to ensure compliance with the Constitution." Id
The notion that a consent to search must be considered voluntary in order to be valid has
its roots in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). The Schneckloth Court
considered the possibility of police advising the accused of his right to refuse consent, but
dismissed this idea as "thoroughly impractical" because consent searches "normally occur...
under informal and unstructured conditions" and "may develop quickly or be a logical
extension of investigative police questioning." Id. at 231-32. Even if one were to concede this
point in the context of a roadside stop or questioning of potential witnesses to a crime, the
"impracticality" does not hold in routine drug sweeps of buses in which police announce their
identity, purpose, and procedures from a script. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying
text. The Eleventh Circuit realized that adding a one-line general warning that passengers
have the right to refuse consent to a search would only take a few seconds.
Interestingly, the per se rule the Eleventh Circuit narrowly averted by considering the
lack of a warning an "important factor" mirrors the original question the Florida appeals
court had certified to the Florida Supreme Court eleven years earlier, but which the Florida
Supreme Court rephrased. See supranotes 48-49 and accompanying text.
100. United States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393, 1395-96 (11th Cir. 2000). The court noted a
fifth factor-testimonial evidence by a bus driver who regularly worked the route and
thought passengers were not free to leave the bus without being searched-supported a
conclusion that a passenger may not have felt free to leave the bus until the bus sweep was
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these factors was implicated either directly or by analogy in the
Supreme Court's Bostick analysis and was likewise noted by the
Florida Supreme Court dissenters on remand. The Eleventh Circuit
in Guapinoted that: (1) the bus was on a layover during which the
passengers naturally wanted to stretch their legs; 1 ' (2) the bus
driver disembarked, leaving the officers as the only authority
figures present;'0 2 (3) the officers' announcement of the bus sweep
was rapid and mumbled, indicating that cooperation
was
4
expected; 03 and (4) the officers blocked the aisle.1
The bus sweep at issue in Guapi was a particularly offensive
procedure that allowed the Eleventh Circuit to get its foot in the
door in re-examining bus sweeps. Unlike the paradigmatic bus
sweep in which officers mount the bus, announce themselves, and
then conduct individualized questioning, the officers in Guapi,
completed. See id. at 1396-97. However, the Guapi analysis has been followed by the
Eleventh Circuit in Washington andSmith, supra note 92, absent such testimony.
101. Id. at 1397. Even though the police inBostick boarded the bus during a short layover
during which passengers were not expected to exit, the Supreme Court nonetheless invoked
the spirit of Chesternut's "free to leave" test by adopting a "free to ignore" standard. The
Court reaffirmed its adherence to Chesternutby expanding its reach. See supra note 65 and
accompanying text. On remand the Florida Supreme Court dissent reasoned that the Bostick
bus sweep "was not a casual encounter' in which a citizen could ignore the police. Bostick v.
State, 593 So. 2d 494, 495-96 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
102. Guapi, 144 F.3d at 1395. The Supreme Courtmajority inBostick specifically rejected
the dissents categorization of the holding as allowing police to gain "consent" to search
through an "intimidatingshow of authority." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991)
(citation omitted). The Court implied that the police cannot manufacture a consent search
situation in such a way as to leverage the inherent authority of being a law enforcement
officer. The Florida Supreme Court dissent on remand noted the sheriffs department
insignia on the raid jackets of the deputies, the implication being that the deputies were
using the authority of their jobs to gain consent. See Bostick, 593 So. 2d at 495 (Barkett, J.,
dissenting).
103. Guapi, 144 F.3d at 1395. The Supreme Court in Bostick made clear that police can
ask an individual for consent to search their luggage only "so long as the officers do not
convey a message that compliance with their requests is required." Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437.
On remand the Florida Supreme Court dissent found the deputies' demeanor significant in
two ways: First, they proceeded directly to Bostick's seat upon boarding the bus, and second,
they persisted in their questioning even after Bostick's ticket and identification were found
to be acceptable. Bostick, 593 So. 2d at 495 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
104. Guapi, 144 F.3d at 1396. Even though the Supreme Court had obviated the need to
make such a determination by adopting the "free to ignore" test in a bus sweep in which a
passenger would not otherwise wish to disembark, the Florida Supreme Court dissenters on
remand nonetheless registered the fact that the officers "stood in the aisle in front of Bostick
and questioned him." Bostick, 593 So. 2d at 495 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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immediately after announcing themselves, asked all of the
passengers to take their luggage from the overhead racks and hold
it open for inspection as the officers walked up and down the
aisle.' 5 This technique led the Eleventh Circuit to conclude that the
"unambiguous message [was] that the attention and cooperation of
all passengers [was] required."0 6 Though the court arguably could
have obviated the need to reach the consent to search analysis by
finding the police tactic employed here to be so egregious as to
conclude the officers had in effect "seized the bus" at the onset of
the encounter,0 7 the court sidestepped that option and decided
Guapi on the voluntariness of the consent-to-search line of cases. 8
Just two months after the Guapi decision, the Eleventh Circuit
in United States v. Washington" again granted a motion to
suppress in a bus-sweep case. Significantly, the court did so not
because the consent to search was coerced, but because the
encounter with the suspect was itself a seizure."0 Judge Roney,
105. Guapi, 144 F.3d at 1394.
106. Id. at 1396.
107. Judge Roney noted the fact that the officer stood in front of the passengers and only
let them off the bus after they had revealed the contents of their luggage. Id at 1396. The
analysis of this point would not have been reached had the court found the initial encounter
(that is, at the time of the boarding and "request" by the officers for passengers to retrieve
and display their luggage) to be a seizure.
108. The court cited Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), and United States v.
Mendenhall,446 U.S. 544 (1980), for the proposition thatpolice can approach people in public
places and ask to conduct consent searches as long as a reasonable person in the situation
would understand that they were free to decline consent and go about their business. Guapi,
144 F.3d at 1394. The Eleventh Circuit then noted its own precedent of United States v.
Fields, 909 F.2d 470 (11th Cir. 1990) and UnitedStates v. Hammock, 860 F.2d 390 (11th Cir.
1988), in which consent searches on buses were prefaced by notices that passengers had the
right to refuse the requests to search. Guapi, 144 F.3d at 1394-95. The court reiterated the
point that, here, the notification was lacking at the request to search stage. Id. at 1395
(noting the "complete lack of any notification to the passengers that they were in fact free to
decline the search request" and later "eschew[ing] the notion ofaper se rule requiring bus
passengers be informed of their constitutional rights prior to a search") (second emphasis
added).
109. 151 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1998). Guapi was decided on June 29, 1998; Washington on
August 28, 1998.
110. See Washington, 151 F.3d at 1357. One may argue that a contention ofthis Note, that
the Supreme Court opinion in Bostick created a two-tiered analysis, is a distinction without
a difference and that GuapiandWashingtonboth ultimately involved impermissible seizures
interwoven with tainted consents to search and that keeping them conceptually disentangled
is misplaced effort. A recent Fourth Amendment standing case from the Tenth Circuit,
however, highlights the importance of the distinction. See United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d
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again writing for the court, indicated that the seizure in
Washington would turn on a Terry-like analysis at the initial
encounter stage:
The Constitution does not permit police officers, without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, to restrain the liberty
of American citizens. The well-established test is that if, by
physical force or show of authority, a reasonable citizen would
not believe that he is free to ignore police questioning and go
about his business, he has been unconstitutionally seized."'
In applying this test, the court pointed to the fact that the bus
sweep began with a "show of authority" in which the officers
announced themselves and held their badges over their heads. 1"
That this case was decided based on the initial encounter stage is
sealed by the court's distinguishing the bus sweep from consent
searches pursuant to vehicle stops upheld by the Supreme Court:
"[]nthis case the agents conducting the search stated no legitimate
reason to detain any passengers on the bus. In [the car search
cases], police obtained consent to search a vehicle only after
lawfully detaining the occupants pursuant to a traffic stop."113 The
Eleventh Circuit then deftly avoided the per se rule eschewed by
the Supreme Court in Bostick by not prohibiting bus sweeps, but
strongly encouraging a warning by police stating that a passenger
can ignore the initial encounter and, by doing so, can avoid the

1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that although an automobile passenger did not have
standing to contest a consent search of a vehicle during which narcotics were found, the
passenger did have standing to contest the stop. In other words, in a car stop scenario, the
passenger had standing to object to the equivalent of the initial encounter stage of a bus
sweep, but did not have standing to object to the analog to the voluntariness of the consent
to search stage of a bus sweep.). In a bus sweep context, the distinction may be crucial. For
instance, in a co-defendant case, if the police show of authority upon boarding is deemed to
amount to a seizure, the evidence against both defendants would be suppressed. Ifthe initial
encounter is not a seizure, however, then the individual search requests would be analyzed.
At this point it would be possible that the totality of the circumstances as to one defendant
could indicate coerced consent, whereas against the other, voluntary consent could be found.
111. Washington, 151 F.3d at 1357 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)).
112. Washington, 151 F.3d at 1357.
113. Id. (citing Ohiov. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); Schnecklothv. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973)).
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request to search altogether." Tellingly, the wording of Judge
Roney's hypothesized warning was similar to that posited in Guapi,
but here the notification applied to the initial encounter, not the
request for consent to search." 5 The Eleventh Circuit's application
of a warning requirement to the initial encounter stage of bus
sweeps strikes a workable balance by allowing the tactic, but
tempering the coercive effect inherent in the confines of a bus. In
effect, the warning levels the playing field by facilitating a
passenger's avoidance of the encounter, an option available to
116
citizens in airports and on sidewalks, but not on buses.
The Eleventh Circuit cemented its decisions in Guapi and
Washington in a pair of 2000 cases, United States v. Smith" 7 and
United States v. Drayton." 8 In Smith, the court determined that
there was "no important distinction between the conduct of the bus
check in this case and the conduct of the bus check in
Washington.""9 The Circuit affirmed its recognition in Washington
that absent a warning that a passenger could ignore an encounter,
'
"the bus check... amounted to a 'seizure.""
Accordingly, the court
again did not reach the consent to search analysis, but it added one
piece to the puzzle not addressed in Washington-thatbus sweeps
absent a warning as to the initial encounter are like Terry stops and
114. Id.

115. Compareid. ("It seems obvious to us that if police officers genuinely want to ensure
that their encounters with bus passengers remain absolutely voluntary, they can simply say
so.") (emphasis added), with United States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393, 1395 (11th Cir. 1998)
("Providing a simple notification to bus passengers that they are free to decline a search is

perhaps the most efficient and effective method to ensure compliance with the Constitution.")
(emphasis added).
116. The warning requirement serves to answer the concerns of several commentators
who rightly observed that officers can leverage the confines of a bus to force encounters onto
unwilling passengers. See, e.g., LaFave, supranote 16, at 750-51; Maclin, supranote 42, at
801-12; James F. Heuerman, Note, Florida v. Bostick. Abandonment of Reason in Fourth
Amendment ReasonablePersonAnalysis, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 173, 191-95 (1992).

The dissent in Washingtonmisplaced the majority's warning requirement by applying it
to the consent to search, not the initial encounter. Washington, 151 F.3d at 1358 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (applying the "totality of the circumstances" test to the search stage, an exercise
the majority did not reach, and concluding that"[sihort of telling the passengers of the right
to refuse consent, it is difficult to conceive of any actions these officers could have taken to
make this search more reasonable").
117. 201 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2000).
118. 231 F.3d 787 (11th Cir. 2000).
119. Smith, 201 F.3d at 1322.
120. Id.
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only require a reasonable suspicion to validate a police search.' 2
Drayton is significant because unlike Smith, the encounter here
occurred after the Guapiand Washington decisions, and the police
appear to have tried to temper their actions to accord with those
decisions, notably in not making a "show of authority" upon
boarding and in not asking passengers to display their tickets and
122
identification prior to requesting consent to search the luggage.
The Eleventh Circuit was not persuaded by the government's
contention that these differences distinguished Drayton from
Guapi and Washington, and the court reaffirmed the necessity for
police to inform passengers that they have a right to refuse the
encounter altogether and consent to refuse to search once an
encounter begins."
In toto, through this series of cases the Eleventh Circuit firmly
established two criteria governing the application of the Bostick
standards to bus sweeps. First, the analysis is to take a seriatim
approach, analyzing first the initial encounter and then the request
to search. Second, absent notification to passengers that they have
the right to decline the initial encounter with police, the encounter
itself will be deemed a seizure and any evidence subsequently found
will be suppressed. Regarding "stage two," the search request
following the consensual encounter, notification to passengers that
121. Id. at 1323. The court found thatthe officers had a reasonable suspicion to search the
luggage of the defendant based on their observation of him. Id Based on the reasonable
suspicion, the court did not have to address the consent issue of whether Smith voluntarily
abandonedhis luggage. Cf Washington,151 F.3d at 1357 (notingthat "the agents conducting
the search stated no legitimate reason to detain any passengers on the bus"). Smith
highlights a significant danger inherent in bus sweeps and a common criticism of the
Exclusionary Rule. Whereas drug couriers will have the evidence of their crimes suppressed,
innocent passengers who feel compelled to comply with intrusive police search requests are
left without a remedy. In this case, the Fourth Amendment rights ofevery passenger on the
bus except Smith were violated as the agents "got their man." See infra notes 132-33,170 and
accompanying text. A federal district court in the Eleventh Circuit has recently upheld a bus
search based on Smith's reasonable suspicion analysis. United States v. Ozuna, 129 F. Supp.
2d 1345, 1353-54 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (citing Smith and noting the four factors observed by the
officer that amounted to a "reasonable suspicion" to conduct a search).
122. Drayton, 231 F.3d at 790-91.
123. Id. at 790 (finding that absent a reassurance that one could ignore the initial
encounter, a passenger-by-passenger "show of authority" is no less coercive than a general
announcement (citing Washington, 151 F.3d at 1355), and noting that the officers in Guapi
had not first asked to examine tickets and identification (citing United States v. Guapi, 144
F.3d 1393, 1393-94, 1397(11th Cir. 2000))).
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they have a right to decline consent is a significant factor
in
24
determining whether the consent was voluntary or coerced.
The Ninth and Tenth CircuitsSplit Over Washington
The dearth of notable circuit court bus sweep opinions in the
wake of Bostick belied the contentiousness of the bus-sweep
procedure. Since the Eleventh Circuit fired the first salvos in the
renewed skirmish over this drug interdiction technique, the Ninth
and Tenth Circuits have each filed lengthy bus-sweep opinions.
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Stephens," followed
Washington by joining "the Eleventh Circuit [in finding] an
unconstitutional seizure occurred under very similar facts."'2 6 In
Stephens, the officers announced themselves upon boarding the bus
and included a warning: "No one is under arrest, and you are free
to leave. However, we would like to talk to you."" The court
criticized the warning for indicating to passengers that they had
only two choices-leave the bus or remain on board and consent to
a search." By not informing passengers "that they were free to
remain on the bus and terminate the encounter by declining to
answer [the officers'] questions," 2 9 the police presented passengers
with a "Hobson's choice because by getting off the bus, a passenger
ran the risk of giving the ... officers reasonable suspicion to stop
. 13 0
him "

124. It is unclear at this point whether a separate notification should be given at the time
the police ask for consent to search, or whether one notice covering passenger rights as to the
encounter and the request to search would be sufficient.
125. 206 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2000).
126. Id. at 918 (citing United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1998)).
127. Stephens, 206 F.3d at 916.
128. Id. at 917.
129. Id. This is precisely the type of warning the Eleventh Circuit called for in
Washington, as discussed supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text, and called for by
Justice Marshall in Bostick. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 450 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that "advising the passengers confronted of their right to decline to
be questioned [would begin to] dispel the aura of coercion and intimidation that pervades
[bus] encounters").
130. Stephens, 206 F.3d at 917. The Ninth Circuit arrived at the "Hobson's choice" by
citing the recent Supreme Court case ofIllinois v. Wardlow, in which the Court held that the
combination of unprovoked flight in a neighborhood known for having high drug activity
amounted to reasonable suspicion. Id. (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 506 U.S. 976 (2000)). The
interesting leap the court made in the hypothetical case of a bus passenger who exits the bus
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While the Stephens majority legitimized the Eleventh Circuit's
approach to bus sweeps, the dissent is also important because it
discussed bus sweeps not as an isolated police practice but as a
"drug war" tactic that must balance the need to enforce drug laws
against the need to protect the rights of all citizens under the
Fourth Amendment."'1 Judge Sneed's dissent rejected Washington

as creating a per se rule inconsistent with Bostick, and he noted the
effectiveness of the bus-sweep technique."3 2 Judge Sneed placed the
normative question undergirding the conduct of the drug war in
high relief: "An innocent person may be inconvenienced but a guilty
person frequently will give himself away."' 3 In Judge Sneed's view,
then, the Supreme Court has indicated that the balance tips in
favor of enforcing drug laws. 13 4 Although the majority of his
in order to avoid the police rests on the premise that a court could find that intercity buses
are known high-drug activity areas, an argument only suggested to this point in police claims
that a particular bus was targeted for a sweep because it emanated from a source city of
narcotics.
131. See Stephens, 206 F.3d at 918 (Sneed, J., dissenting) ("Within this nation there is an
enduring tension between the common needs of all and the separate and distinct needs of
individuals.").
132. See id at 919 n.2 (Sneed, J., dissenting) (rejecting the necessity of a "Miranda-like
warning incorporating the advice that all passengers, including the defendant specifically,
could stay on the bus and refuse to answer any questions"). In an interesting bit of dicta,
Judge Sneed hypothesized that the result of requiring such a warning would be that police
would subject all bus luggage to canine sniff tests. Id. This imagined result indicates a bias
for the "common need" to perpetuate the war on drugs, whereas blanket warnings or a
scaling back of bus sweeps altogether emphasizes the "distinct needs of individuals." See
supra note 131.
133. Stephens, 206 F.3d at 920 (Sneed, J., dissenting). Judge Sneed's frank recognition of
the stakes rests on the premise that police bus sweeps engender coercion. For the innocent,
coercion is allowed as long as it is only "inconvenient." For the guilty, coercion is needed to
make the drug courier"give himself away." Judge Sneed's calculation ignores the social costs
that are part and parcel of dragnet-style drug sweeps. See Sandra Guerra, Domestic Drug
InterdictionOperations:Findingthe Balance, 82 J. Cmi. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 1109, 113940
(1992):
[B]ecause the freedom to travel about in public without unjustified official
interference is one ofour most cherished liberties, the extent to which the police
operations may intrude officiously into the private lives ofinnocent people who
have done nothing to draw suspicion onto themselves should be considered of
overriding importance.
Id. (citation omitted).
134. In this regard, Judge Sneed has much company in the academic community. See
Maclin, supra note 42, at 811-12 (criticizing the Supreme Court's analysis in Bostick for
"show[ing] contempt for individual liberty and the Fourth Amendment" because the Court
"apparently believes that this sort [of] police practice is necessary, and therefore,
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brethren on this Ninth Circuit panel agreed with the Eleventh
Circuit that the FourthAmendment protection ofcitizens outweighs
the law enforcement needs on the close question of bus sweeps
absent express warnings, Judge Sneed's view holds sway in the
Tenth Circuit.
In United States v. Broomfield,3 ' the Tenth Circuit read Bostick
as rejecting "[a]ny analysis approaching a per se rule" in the context
of the Fourth Amendment.' The defendant in Broomfield cited
both Guapi and Washington in arguing that his motion to suppress
should be granted due to the coercive nature of the officers' conduct
during the bus sweep as exacerbated by the confines of the bus.'
The court recited the facts of Guapi and agreed with the Eleventh
Circuit's analysis and conclusion that the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the Guapi bus sweep "understandably
warranted a finding of coercion.""'8 In the procedure at issue in
Broomfield, the officers did not make a general announcement upon
boarding; rather, they approached and questioned passengers
individually." 9 Crucial to the defendant's claim was that the
officers did not warn him that he had the right to refuse the initial
encounter and, given the authoritative police actions, "no
reasonable person would [have felt] free to refuse [the] search
request." 4 ° The Tenth Circuit found the lack of such notification to
reasonable"); Heuerman, supranote 116, at 196-99 (concluding that the Bostick Court chose
to allow the police to zealously pursue the war on drugs at the expense of "inconveniencing
countless bus travelers"). Other commentators imply that the supposed Supreme Court bias
favoring drug interdiction efforts over civil liberties has filtered down to the cop on the beat.
See MIcHAEL K BROWN, WORKING THE STREar. PoLicE DISCRETION AND THE DILEMMAS OF
REFoRm 161 (1988) (arguing that the use of "police-initiated actions" such as "the frequent
use of field interrogations" are employed because police believe "the deterrent effect of
aggressive patrol often takes precedence over other objectives"); Guerra, supranote 133, at
1160-61 (likening inquisitorial drug sweeps to the internment ofJapanese-Americans during
World War II in concluding that recent "Supreme CourtO Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
provides only the most minimal protection from intrusive police actions").
135. 201 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2000).
136. Id. at 1274 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1991)).
137. Id. at 1273.
138. Id. at 1274.
139. Id. at 1275. In this regard, the procedure here was most closely analogous to that of
Draytor. In the Eleventh Circuit's view, a passenger-by-passenger questioning was no less
coercive than one begun with a general announcement, and still requires a notification. See
supranotes 122-23 and accompanying text.
140. Id. at 1273 (claiming that the officer "did not act to defuse the anxiety of the situation
or in any way advise him he had a right to refuse consent").
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be "dispositive in Washington, thus creating a per se rule that
authorities must notifybus passengers of the right to refuse consent
before questioning those passengers ... [which] render[ed] the

soundness of the Washington opinion questionable."14'
Declaring the soundness of another circuit's opinion
"questionable" is a judicial euphemism for an outright rejection of
that court's reasoning. The question becomes one of judicial line
drawing. That those lines are only now being drawn, ten years after
the Supreme Court addressed bus sweeps, is the essence of
Bostick's "long distance remand." The Eleventh and Ninth Circuits
have adopted the view that, absent Miranda-likewarnings, on-bus
consent searches will be presumptively invalid. The Tenth Circuit
has countered that the approach of the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits
amounts to the type of per se rule the Supreme Court has
repeatedly rejected in the Fourth Amendment context, and that
paradigmatic bus sweeps, absent warnings, can produce legal
consent searches.
As this part has shown, case law addressing bus-sweep
procedures reveals that the tactic raises extremely close constitutional questions calling for a nuanced, fact-specific analysis. The
seminal case involving Terry Bostick produced 4-3 decisions on its
first two trips to the Florida Supreme Court, and the six-Justice
majority in the United States Supreme Court faced a vigorous
and well-regarded dissent by Justice Thurgood Marshall. The
conspicuous absence of federal circuit court opinions applying the
Bostick standards to bus sweeps suggests that the Florida Supreme
Court's abdication of its responsibility to apply the Bostick
standards on remand chilled judicial review of the tactic across the
board. Through most of the 1990s, the circuit courts seemingly
followed the Florida Supreme Court's view that Bostick was a
stamp of approval of bus sweeps from the nation's highest court.
The Eleventh Circuit's 1998 decision in Guapi, however,
refocused judicial attention on bus sweeps. The circuits have agreed
on the factor-by-factor analysis of the search request in Guapi,but
141. Id. at 1275. The Tenth Circuit would go no further than agreeing that notification
was a relevant fact to consider. Id. The court then concluded that in this case the absence of
notification was overwhelmed by other circumstances which indicated that Broomfield had
neither been illegally seized at the initial encounter stage nor was his consent to search the
product of impermissible police coercion. Id.
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have split 2-1 on the arguably per se encounter warning
requirement of Washington. Yet, even while rejecting Washington
as inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, the Tenth Circuit
conceded the closeness of the question: "[Elstablish[ing] a per se
rule that authorities must either notify bus passengers they have
the right to refuse consent or, due to the unavoidable space
constraints, refrain altogether from questioning passengers ...
might arguably constitute good policy ....
"'142
The next section explores the bus sweep tactic through the lens
of psychological theory and argues that the Eleventh Circuit was
correct to recognize the psychological force drug interdiction officers
can exert on passengers to yield "consent." Specifically, the next
section contends that the confines of a bus are an especially ripe
setting for police coercion, that police "requests" to search are often
thinly-veiled demands, and that citizens are inclined to obey police
"requests." Because police are able to leverage on-bus encounters to
elicit "consent" from citizens who find it difficult to defy authority,
the Eleventh Circuit was right to require police to notify passengers
of their Fourth Amendment rights.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF Bus SWEEPS
Psychological coercion is at the core of the Fourth Amendment
analysis concerning both the initial encounter and the request-tosearch stages of bus sweeps. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Bostick
viewed the confines of a bus as psychologically coercive by noting
that "[t]here is no doubt that if this same encounter had taken place
before Bostick boarded the bus or in the lobby of the bus terminal,
it would not rise to the level of a seizure."14 3 Because bus sweeps are
142. Id.
143. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). The Court here used the terms
"encounter" and "seizure" in the broad sense to encompass the initial approach and the
request to search. As discussed previously, the Court rightly separated the analysis of the
two stages by concluding that even ifthe initial encounter was consensual, an impermissible
seizure could still occur if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search request
indicated that the passenger's consent to search was involuntary. The Eleventh Circuit
highlighted this crucial point by finding an impermissible initial encounter in Washington
and an impermissible request to search (following an initial encounter deemed by the court
to be a permissible nonseizure) in GuapL For the purpose of clarity, this Note employs
"encounter" and "seizure" to apply only to the initial police-citizen encounter and "request
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warrantless searches lacking the reasonable, articulable suspicion
to support a Terry stop-and-frisk, the constitutionality of a given
bus sweep is analyzed under the rubric of consent searches.1 4 To
comport with the standards of this judicially created exception to
the warrant requirement, the initial encounter between the police
and bus passengers must remain consensual and the consent to
search must be given voluntarily. 45 If an officer conducts himself in
such a way that the citizen he approaches will not feel free to ignore
him, the citizen is considered impermissibly "seized" under the
Fourth Amendment and any incriminating evidence found during
a subsequent search will be suppressed in court. Likewise, if after
agreeing to interact with an officer, a citizen's compliance with a
search request is deemed to have been the result of police-induced
duress or coercion, the consent to search is invalidated and any
evidence found during the search will be inadmissible in court.
The Supreme Court has applied the proscription against
unsupported seizures broadly. Most significant for analyzing bus
sweeps, the Court has determined that a citizen need not desire to
leave the site of the encounter to be considered impermissibly
seized 46 and that police-generated "subjective intrusion[s]" which
elicit "concern or even fright" on the part of travelers likewise
indicate a seizure." 7 In neither case was the "seizure" predicated
on physical contact; psychological coercion exerted under the
auspices of legal authority rose to the level of a Fourth Amendment
violation.
The voluntariness determination of a consent to search is
grounded inMirandav. Arizona" and subsequent confession cases,
all of which "assessed the psychological impact on the accused."" 9
The Supreme Court applied the psychological principles developed
to search" and "involuntary" to apply to the consent to search.
144. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
145. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-501 (1983) (plurality opinion).
146. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (indicating that a court can
find an impermissible seizure "even where the person did not attempt to leave").
147. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976).
148. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
149. See Schnecklothv. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,226 (1973) (collecting cases); Miranda,
384 U.S. at 445-58 (citing police tactics in eliciting confessions and stressing that "the
modern process of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically
oriented").
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in the confession context in formulating the consent search
standard set forth in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.5 o Schneckloth
balanced "the legitimate need for such searches and the equally
important requirement of assuring the absence of coercion." 51
Under its reasonableness inquiry, the Court concluded that an
officer is not obligated to receive a waiver of rights from a suspect
before conducting a search.'52 As long as the consent to search is
deemed "voluntary" under the totality of the circumstances, it will
be considered "reasonable" for Fourth Amendment purposes." To
arrive at this conclusion, the Court compared the custodial
warnings mandated by Miranda""to noncustodial search requests
and determined that due to the "informal and unstructured
conditions" which usually surround search requests, they are
"immeasurably far removed from 'custodial interrogation" and are
less susceptible to the psychologically coercive interrogation
practices which
the Miranda warnings are intended to
155
counteract.

Even if one were to concede that the car search at issue in
Schneckloth was not a situation prone to police-coerced "consent,"
on-bus encounters are more akin to custodial interrogations in that
the confines of a bus create a ripe setting for psychologically
coercive police practices. Unlike driver-prompted automobile stops
which have innumerable variations, bus sweeps are planned,
routinized, and police-dominated events.' 56 Because bus sweeps are
150. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
151. Id. at 227.
152. Id. at 241-45.
153. Id. at 248-49.
154. The Supreme Court has determined recently that Miranda was not merely a
prophylactic measure ensuring a suspect's protection against self-incrimination, but that it
declared a constitutional rule grounded in the Fifth Amendment. See Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428,443-44 (2000). The constitutionalizing ofMirandamay strengthen the
foundation of its warnings to the degree that the prophylactic search warnings rejected in
Schneckloth will have a strongerfoothold if the Court revisits consent searches in the context
of bus sweeps.
155. Schneckloth,412 U.S. at 232; see alsoAdrianJ. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte: IncorporatingObedience Theory into the Supreme Court's Conception of
Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 215, 231-32 (discussing the Supreme Coures
reluctance to extend its presumption ofpsychological coercion in custodial interrogations to
noncustodial searches).
156. Compare United States v. Cuevas-Ceja, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1179-80 (Or. 1999)
(detailing the local sheriffdepartment's eighteen-point guideline for conducting bus sweeps),
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substantially similar and predictable, the officers who conduct them
may learn to apply subtle yet impermissibly coercive techniques
that appear to elicit voluntary consents to search. A Miranda-like
consideration of psychologically coercive factors in the context of
157
bus sweeps is, therefore, appropriate. Further, the Eleventh
with Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231-32 (considering it "thoroughly impractical" to require
warnings to precede consent searches because they "normally occur on the highway ... and
under informal and unstructured conditions. The circumstances that prompt the initial
request to search may develop quickly....").
157. See generally Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448 (stressing that modern-day "in-custody
interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented" and that the Court "ha[d]
recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical") (citation omitted). Of the four
warnings which comprise a suspect's "Mirandarights," the "right to remain silent" is
analogous to the informed waiver of a passenger's right to decline the on-bus encounter and
the consent to search critical to the Eleventh Circuits analysesin Guapiand Washington and
supported in this Note. See id. at 479.
The second of the Mirandawarnings, that "anything [a suspect] says can be used against
[the individual] in a court of law," also leads to an interesting analysis in the bus sweep
scenario. See id. During the oral arguments in Bostick, Justice Marshall asked: "[Wihy do
dope pushers plead guilty? ... I mean, when I have got dope on me, and I say search me, am
I notpleadingguilty?"Justice Thurgood Marshall, OralArgument Before the Supreme Court
ofthe United States (Feb. 26,1991), in Transcript of Oral Argument at *14,1991 U.S. Trans.
LEXIS 156, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). Based on the dissenting opinion he
authored, it is most likely that Justice Marshall accepted Bostick's claim that the search
must have been the product ofa coercive seizure "because no reasonable person would freely
consent to a search of luggage that he or she knows contains drugs." Bostick, 501 U.S. at 43738. This view is coterminous with the proposition that drug couriers traveling by bus
"consent" to searches because of police coercion. See id. at 450 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that police had developed the bus sweep tactic because it forced passengers to
choose between consenting to a search or possibly being stranded mid-journey, a "choice
Justice Marshall saw as "no 'choice' at all").
An empirical study of consent searches, however, offers another explanation-that drug
traffickers who consent to a search they know will reveal drugs, may not also know that the
contraband will be used to convict them at trial. See Dorothy K Kagehiro, Perceived
Voluntarinessof Consentto WarrantlessPoliceSearches,38 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 38,4546 (1988) (finding that although 96% of the study participants understood the concept of a
search warrant and 92% understood that absent a search warrant, the police could conduct
a search only with the participants' consent, only 49% of the subjects understood that any
contraband discovered would be admissible evidence in court and only 28% understood that
the evidence would be admissible even if police did not inform the consentor of their right to
refuse). Professor Kagehiro's study of college-educated subjects suggests that even though
one understands the difference between searches grounded on warrants and those based on
consent, he does not necessarily grasp the legal implications of consenting to a search. It is
entirely possible 'that drug-transporting bus passengers mistakenly believe that by
voluntarily turning the drugs over to police, they either cannot, or will not, be prosecuted.
The MirandaCourt indicated that this lack ofawareness ofthe consequences ofconfessing
(or analogously, consenting to a search) formed the crux ofMiranda'ssecond warning- "This
warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the
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Circuit's recent treatment of the bus sweep drug interdiction tactic
is faithful to the Supreme Court's recognition that police can exert
psychological pressure on bus passengers to elicit consents to
search158 and that Miranda-like warnings are an appropriate
antidote to the coercion.
The following discussion of coercion as it relates to one's use of
space and the subtly coercive ways in which police can leverage the
confines of a bus to elicit consents to search focuses on the request
to search stage of a bus sweep.159 This stage has been selected
for illustrative purposes only; the discussion would apply equally
to seizure determinations based on the initial police-citizen
encounter. 160

consequences of foregoing it." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. Interestingly, though no bus-sweep
cases have mentioned that this type of extended warningwas given, a leading police manual
used by hundreds of departments nationwide includes just such a warning in its suggested
request-to-search phrasing. See JOHN G. MIUM, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OFFICER'S PocKET
MANUAL § 7:16-17 (Thomas J.O'Toole, Jr. ed., 1998) (recommending officers of departments
requiring a "search and seizure warning" to say. "Ifyou do consent, any evidence we find may
be used in a criminal prosecution.").
158. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438-39 (finding the "cramped confines of a bus are one
relevant factor" in determining whether the consent was granted voluntarily and noting that
"[ciitizens do not forfeit their constitutional rights when they are coerced to comply with a
request that they would prefer to refuse").
159. In directing courts to consider the "totality of the circumstances" in determining
whether an on-bus police-citizen encounter rose to a Fourth Amendment violation, the
Supreme Court reiterated its century-old admonition to courts to be wary of subtle, but
nonetheless illegal, police practices. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) ("It
may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate
and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.").
160. Compare United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1984) (establishing the
"free to leave" test as "whether the respondent's consent to accompany the agents was in fact
voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is to be determined
by the totality of all the circumstances"), with Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49 (requiring the
prosecution to prove that "consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress
or coercion, express or implied" and that "[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be
determined from all the circumstances"). The Mendenhall test, adapted to bus sweeps in
Bostick as a "free to decline the encounter" test, is substantially similar to the consent to
search voluntariness test. Both tests seek to determine where a particular citizen's
motivations fall on the spectrum between voluntary and coerced actions and both look to the
totality of the surrounding circumstances in making the determination.
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Coercion, Confines, and Consent
In Schneckloth, whether coercion tainted the consent to search in
a given case was seen as a fact-specific determination to be gleaned
from the "totality of all the circumstances,"161 including "the
environment in which [the request to consent to a search] took
place."'62 In fastening upon the environmental factor by finding that
the facts of the case "graphically illustrate[d that] the cramped
confines of a bus create an environment uniquely susceptible to
coercive police tactics,"163 the Eleventh Circuit in Guapi recognized
the implications of the Latin roots of "coercion." By way of the noun
"arctum"(a box, or more ominously, a coffin) and the verb "arcdre"
(to confine), "coercion" is derived from "coercdre" (to restrain).'64
In its purest sense, then, "coercion7 relates to restrictions or
limitations on one's use of space. 6 ' Directly applicable to the bus
sweep context, "[c]oercion characterizes a situation when one or
more persons are restrained by one or more others from using a
space in some way, providing that the coerced person planned to
use the space in the manner that is being prevented, and the
coercer expressly intended to prevent that use."'66 For a bus
passenger, the planned use of the space is to travel free of police
questioning. Becoming the target of a suspicionless bus sweep
167
prevents that use.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
Id. at 247.
United States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393, 1395 (11th Cir. 1998).
OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY(2nd ed. 1989).

165. See MichaelA. Weinstein, Coercion,Space, and the Modes of HumanDomination,in
COERCION 63, 66 (J.Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972) (arguing that at "the
center of coercion is effective control of space").
166. Id. at 65.
167. Though the characterization of a passenger's intended use as including freedom from
police questioning likely injects a consideration which is not consciously weighed by the vast
majority of bus passengers, it is nonetheless valid. It is the extraordinary passenger who
would welcome police to board a bus to search one's carry on luggage. Even though the
"reasonable person" standard "presupposes an innocent person," Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429, 438 (1991) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 519 n.4 (1983)) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting), the Supreme Court has noted recently that bus passengers are especially
sensitive to divulging the contents of their carry on items. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S.
334, 337-38 (2000) (noting in the context of a bus sweep that "travelers are particularly
concerned about their carry-on luggage; they generally use it to transport personal items
that, for whatever reason, they prefer to keep close at hand); see also Michigan Dep't of

400

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:365

A second aspect of coercion that is especially telling in the context
of suspicionless bus sweep searches is that "coercion' is ... an

achievement word; it denotes success."168 Because one onlybecomes
a coercer at the point that the coerced person is made to act in a
particular way, "attempted coercion" can be considered an
oxymoron. 169 That coercion denotes success masks the true nature
of suspicionless drug sweeps in two ways. First, because an
"attempted coercion" can exist only in one's imagination, a grant of
consent to search one's carry on luggage is more likely to be viewed
as a product of the consent-giver's choice. In other words, because
denials of requests to search by definition preclude coercion, they
are the product of free choice. Because judges never see either
search-request deniers or consent-search granters who were not
carrying incriminating items, any claim of coercion by one who
consented to a search will be viewed as suspect by a court. After all,
in order to find a consent to search to be the product of coercion,
judges must reconcile the perfect correlation between the small
subset of bus passengers who carry contraband and who consent to
a search with the subset of bus passengers who were coerced by
police. Second, the harm done to "innocent" bus passengers who are
asked to consent to a search is diffuse; although a passenger may
feel "put out" by the request, he is not likely to invest much energy
in pursuing a complaint.170
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,465 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Unwanted attention
from the local police need not be less discomforting simply because one's secrets are not the
stuff of criminal prosecutions.").
168. Michael D. Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, in COERCION 16,19 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1972).
169. See id at 19-20.

170. See Tracey Maclin, The CentralMeaningof the FourthAmendment, 35 WM.& MARY
L. REV. 197, 244 (1993) (arguing that "individuals subjected to [suspicionless bus] searches
are not likely to complain because it is probably not worth the bother"); see also BROWN,
supra note 134, at 179 (positing that from the perspective of police officers, the danger of
aggressive search practices is not that the evidence will be suppressed in court, but that
unsupported searches "inevitably lead[] to resentment from the community"); HOWARD S.
COHEN & MICHAEL FELDBERG, POWER AND RESTRAINT: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF POLICE

WORK 48-53 (1991) (arguing that although innocent people subjected to unnecessary
searches seldom file complaints, the searches tend to weaken the social contract by straining
the public trust which relies on police restraint in enforcement practices); D.F. GUNDERSON
& ROBERT HOPPER, COMMUNICATION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 25 (1984) (positing that

although coercion "is a fairly effective means ofbehavior modification over the short term,"
it can have the effect of reinforcing negative attitudes about the police); Guerra, supranote
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Further, the subset of "innocent" passengers who have the
gumption to complain are caught in a Catch-22: if they deny a
request to search they-by defintion-have not been coerced; if
they consent and complain, they admit to folding in the face of the
agents.' 7 It seems logical to posit that passengers who would deny
133, at 1110 (arguing that"operations that effectively place every person investigated under
suspicion until they convince the police of their innocence tend to alienate the public"); cf
Lee D. Ross, SituationistPerspectiveson the ObedienceExperiments,33 CoNTEMP. PSYCHOL.
101, 102 (1988) (finding it troubling that "no subject in ... the obedience experiments ever
undertook the task of exposing the experimenter's excesses to responsible authorities").
This discussion mirrors a major criticism of the Exclusionary Rule-that it provides no
remedy for "unlawful searches ... of innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating,
inwhichno arrest is made, aboutwhich courts ... never hear." Brinegarv. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the
ExclusionaryRule Rest on a 'PrincipledBasis'RatherThan an 'EmpiricalProposition'?,16
CREIGHTON L. REv. 565, 665 (1983) (calling for legislation to provide a remedy for innocent
people subjected to unconstitutional searches as a supplement to the Exclusionary Rule).
171. LaFave, supra note 16, at 751 (arguing that it is only the unusually thick-skinned
passengerwho could refuse to cooperate with the police by denying consent to searchbecause
"the dynamics of the [bus sweep] situation make a nonconforming refusal to cooperate an
especially unlikely choice").
That intercity bus passengers tend to be poor minorities contributes to the lack of an
organized resistence to the procedure has not been lost on at least one court. United States
v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784,789-90 (D.D.C.), rev'd 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (recounting
that the Constitution protects the"freedoms and liberties" of"all our citizens whether or not
they are in a privileged position or indeed even have the desire to protes"). The Lewis trial
court went on to suggest that the "deprivation ofrights" inherent in the typical narcotics bussweep situation had escaped great public scrutiny because intercity buses "are utilized
largely by the underclass of this nation who, because of greater concerns (such as being able
to survive), do not often complain about such deprivations." Id. Several commentators have
noted suspicionless drug sweeps' disproportionate impact on the minority community. Tracy
Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"-Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth
Amendment Seizures: ShouldRaceMatter?,26VAL. L.REv. 243,248 (1991) (contending that
on an interpersonal level race and the "mistrust that surrounds encounters between black
men and police officers" are "hobgoblin[s] lurking in the shadows" of the Supreme Court's
Bostick decision and that by ignoring the element of race in its Fourth Amendment seizure
analyses, "the Courthides behind alegalfiction); O'Shields, supranote 16, at 1901-06 (1992)
(noting that ridership statistics which show that poor blacks make up a disproportionate
share of intercity bus passengers are comparable to arrest statistics which reveal that the
percentage of narcotics arrests of African-Americans is more than three times greater than
their percentage of the general population. O'Shields concludes that buses are used as a
proxy for race and serve to mask the racist action of targeting intercity buses.); see also
Christopher Quinn, PoorAre Targeted in Searches on Buses; All Riders TreatedLike Drug
Smugglers, Lawyer Charges, THE PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 6, 1999, at 1A ("The class of people
[drug interdiction agents] are dealing with in buses tend to be poor and more compliant....
Can you imagine if they boarded a businessman's flight out of Cleveland Hopkins
[International Airport]?") (second brackets in original) (quoting Case Western Reserve
University law professor Louis Katz); cf. Oliver, supra note 38, at 1422-25 (conducting a
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a request to search while the vast majority of fellow passengers
consent are the same individuals who would have the wherewithal
to pursue a complaint. 7 2 Having denied consent to search, though,
by definition the complaining passenger would not have been
coerced and seemingly would have little to complain about.
Revealing intercity bus passengers to be especially susceptible to
the use of psychological coercion by police and showing that such
coercion may reside in a judicial "blind spot" does not prove that the
bus sweep tactic itself is inherently coercive to the point of
necessitating Miranda-like warnings. After all, the psychologically
coercive interrogation policepracticesinthe custodial setting moved
the Court to mandate the warnings. "s The remainder of this part
examines police actions in implementing the tactic by proceeding
from the bus setting to the police-citizen interaction during bus
sweeps. The psychological theories of speech acts and obedience to
authority are effective vehicles to understanding the police-citizen
dynamic in the bus sweep setting. Though not explicitly cited, these
theories informed the Supreme Court's Bostick decision, and the
Eleventh Circuit was correct to tacitly recognize their applicability
in granting the motions to suppress in Guapi and Washington.
Speech Acts
The Supreme Court in Bostick noted that officers may ask a bus
traveler for consent to search his luggage "as long as the police do
not convey a message that compliance with their requests is
required."'7 4 The Bostick majority realized that to correctly
statistical analysis of the disproportionate number of minorities stopped for traffic
violations). See generally BROWN, supra note 134, at 176-79 (arguing that the
disproportionate percentage of arrests ofminorities is due in part to the biased perspective
with which police view innocuous actions by minorities).
172. The vast majority of citizens police ask to search allow them to do so. E.g., United
States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393, 1396 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting officer's testimony that in
conducting "28 on up" bus sweeps per week over the course of a year, the officer could only
recall "several times" passengers refused to permit searches); United States v. Felder, 732
F. Supp. 204, 205 (D.D.C. 1990) (recording officer testimony that only three or four out of
eighty-five passengers had refused consent to an interview).
173. See AKHiL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 56 (1997)
(describing Miranda as "purport[ing] to establish propriety in police-station interrogation"

and "promis[ing] to open up the black box of the police station").
174. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991).
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understand the essence of a police request to conduct a consent
search, jurists must separate the text of the request from the
subtext of its delivery.175 By recognizing the need to affect this
separation in order to ascertain the true voluntariness of the
consent granted, the Court tacitly applied speech act theory to bus
sweeps.
Speech act theory posits that conversation has both direct
"locutional" and indirect "illocutional" components. 176 For instance,
the locution "Can you turn out the light?" in its direct sense asks
177
whether one has the ability to flick the switch or pull the chain.
The illocutional component, or "speech act," is the request to turn
the light off; but it may also be a romantic invitation from one
sweetheart to another or a warning from a parent to a reluctant
child at bedtime.17 The degree to which the addressee interprets
the interrogative as a request or a warning which "yields a
conveyed meaning that does not coincide with its literal meaning"
is a function of context.179 Bypassing the literal to address the
implication of the locution is so common and necessary that the
translation becomes automatic: the speaker and addressee
instantaneously recognize the interrogatory locution as a form of
invitation or warning. 8 ' This unmediated translation is key to
175. By recognizing that a "request" in the form of an interrogatory sentence may in fact
be closer to a police command, the Bostick Court was instructing judges to be aware of the
potential for bus sweeps to present a formidable, situationally driven perceived lack ofchoice
to a passenger, a consideration often lost in the sanitized setting of post-hoc courts. See
Dorothy K Kagehiro & Ralph B. Taylor, Exploringthe FourthAmendment: SearchesBased
on Consent,in HANDBOOKOFPSYCHOLOGYAND LAW 21,28 (Dorothy K. Kagehiro & William
S. Laufer eds., 1992).
In other federal circuit bus-interdiction cases finding that the requested consent was
voluntary, courts have likewise focused on the delivery as well as the text of the police
request. United States v. Hill, 199 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing uncontroverted
testimony that the manner ofquestioning was "very friendly'); United States v. Lewis, 921
F.2d 1294, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting the officer's "low, conversational tone"); United
States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 711 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding it significant that the questions
were delivered with a "non-threatening ... demeanor").
176. MICHAEL L. GEis, SPEECH ACTS AND CONVERSATIONAL INTERACTION 3 (1995).
177. See id. at 8.
178. See id. at 3.
179. Herbert H. Clark & Peter Lucy, UnderstandingWhat Is Meant from What Is Said:
A Study in ConversationallyConveyed Requests, 14 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV.

56, 57 (1975).
180. See id. at 57, 70.
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properly understanding the officer-passenger dynamic ofthe search
request of a bus sweep.
That law enforcement officers are "engaged in the often
competitive enterprise offerreting out crime"'81 creates an incentive
for police to structure consent search requests in such a way that
passengers will indeed consent and that any evidence uncovered
will be admissible in court by a determination that the consent was
voluntary.18 2 In Bostick, the Court took note of the Florida trial
court's finding that "the police specifically advised Bostick that he
had the right to refuse consent" before "request[ing] [Bostick's]
consent to search his luggage."' However, the Court was not
willing to accept this finding at face value-whether this was a
legitimate "request" rather than a "demand" for consent was not
addressed in the record and became a question of fact to be sorted
Rather than praise the
out by the Florida courts on remand.'
181. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
182. This is the essence of the balancingtest announced in Schneckloth. "[Tiwo competing
concerns must be accommodated in determining the meaning of a voluntary' consent-the
legitimate need for such searches and the equally important requirement of assuring the
absence of coercion." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). More than fifty
years ago, Justice Robert Jackson was wary of the ability of police to manipulate Supreme
Court dictates by complying with the letter of the law while circumventing the intent of the
applicable Fourth Amendment rule: "We must remember that the extent of any privilege of
search and seizure without warrant which we sustain, the officers interpret and apply
themselves and will push to the limit." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
Two aspects of the courtroom reconstruction of bus sweeps should be mentioned here.
First, testimonial recreations of a particular bus sweep may serve to sanitize the encounter
because they lack the immediacy ofon-bus encounters, the coercive dynamics of which may
he lost in the translation. Second, officer testimony is typically relied upon to set the scene
of the bus sweep in question. That the determination of coercion often turns on the minute
details of an officer's testimony of his own actions leads one to wonder whether"the principal
effect of the Supreme Court's carefully crafted interpretations of the Constitution on the
behavior of those to whom their words are directed is to teach the police what they should
say on the witness stand rather than what they should do in the streets." H. RICHARD
ULIVR, TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR'S YEAR ON THE STREETS WITH THE

NEW YORK CY POLICE 116 (1988); see also JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE 392 (1973)
(noting that even for officers who testify truthfully, there is little to dissuade them from
coercive searches because officer testimony "that reveals he conducted an illegal search ...
is not chastised or punished; if he confiscated drugs or a weapon, he may feel that he has
served a useful purpose").
183. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431-32 (1991).
184. See id. at 437. As explained in the previous Part, the Florida Supreme Court on
remand inexplicably abdicated its responsibility to determine the context and, therefore, the
meaning of the "request."
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Court for recognizing the applicability of speech act theory in
adjudicating bus sweeps, the dissent seemed to condemn the Court
for not taking the next step of applying the theory itself.1" For the
Court to have done so despite the lack of a trial court finding of fact
on the context ofthe request, however, would have been antithetical
to the very theory the Court was promoting.
Disappointingly, inits summary reversal of its decision two years
earlier, the Florida Supreme Court did not accept Justice
O'Connor's invitation to determine the illocutional component of the
officer's request to search. By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in
Guapitook up the mantle of speech act theory and, given the robust
report of the federal magistrate judge, was able to apply it as well.
Early in its opinion, the Guapicourt indicated that it would engage
not only the facts in the record of the case, but the context in which
those facts arose.1" At the outset of the Guapi bus sweep, a police
officer mounted the bus and asked for passengers' "consent and
cooperation" during the interdiction. 8 7 The court noted that the
officer "apparently made his announcement very quickly" and that
even when the officer was testifying to the wording of his
announcement during the hearing before the magistrate, it was
difficult to understand what he was saying."8 8 In the Eleventh
Circuit's view, though the locutional element of the announcement
was in the form of a request, the "unambiguous message [was] that
the attention and cooperation of all passengers [was] required."8 9
Despite the officer's agreeable wording, then, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that a passenger "in Guapi's position would not have felt
free to decline [the officer's] request to search on-board luggage. " "
185. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 447 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that passengers are
unlikely to refuse a police "request" to consent to a search because "such behavior would only
arouse the officers' suspicions and intensify their interrogation). Similar sentiments were
later echoed by some commentators. See supranote 170; Maclin, supra note 42, at 812 n.338
(criticizing Bostick while noting that "Itlo the person in the street ... the distinction between
a police 'request' and 'demand' is likely to be illusory").
186. United States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393, 1395 (11th Cir. 1998) (declaring that "police
must do more than simply avoid a laundry list of the most egregiously abusive police
tactics.... [They] must behave in a manner calculated to convey to a reasonable person that
cooperation with law enforcement is voluntary").
187. Id. at 1394.
188. I& at 1396.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1397.
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Accordingly, Guapi's consent to the search
was invalidated as the
91
involuntary product of police coercion.
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Washington perceived a
disconnect between the text of the agent's "request" upon
boarding9 2 and the manner in which the "request" was made. 93
Though the locutional component of the officer's request to enter
into a consensual encounter with the passengers was in the form of
an interrogatory, the court interpreted the agent's illocutional
speech act to be an "announce[ment of] what he wanted the
passengers to do, and what he was going to do." 9 ' The majority's
analysis here offered a slight twist on the Supreme Court's Bostick
opinion, but was entirely faithful to Bostick's "totality of the
circumstances" analysis. Whereas the Supreme Court had prohibited police from "convey[ing] a message that compliance with
their requests is required" 195 in the context of the request to search,
the Eleventh Circuit applied the prohibition to the request to
engage in the initial police-citizen encounter. In applying the speech
act component at the initial encounter stage, the Eleventh Circuit
enforced the "free to leave" principle stressed in Bostick 96 in the
context of an on-bus encounter in which the passenger
wished to
97
refuse the encounter while remaining seated.
191. Id.
192. United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354, 1355 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting the

announcement of Agent Perkins which contained the word "please" three times in a single
sentence: "[Ifwe could please see your bus ticket, some photo identification ifyou have some
with you, please, and if you would please identify which bag[] is yours .... ") (alteration in
original).
193. See id. at 1357 (finding that the bus sweep "was consciously designed to take full
advantage of a coercive environment").
194. Id.
195. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991).
196. See id
197. Washington, 151 F.3d at 1357. Quoting Judge Black's dissent in Washington, the
Tenth Circuit in Broomfield contended that, contrary to the Supreme Court's avoidance of
per se rules in Fourth Amendment contexts, and though such a rule may be wise policy, the
Washington majority created a per se rule that bus searches absent warnings constitute
impermissible seizures. United States v. Broomfield, 201 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2000)
("Although we agree such notification is a relevant fact to consider, it cannot be dispositive
of the reasonableness inquiry."). Speech act theory helps to answer the "difficult" challenge
posed by the Tenth Circuit "to imagine how authorities could ever conduct a reasonable
search [absent warnings]." Id. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit addressed its own challenge when
it noted that even though the drug interdiction agent "did not inform Mr. Broomfield of his
right to refuse consent, he spoke to him in an even tone of voice ... and made no coercive or
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Speech act theory provides a framework for understanding the
way in which police, while maintaining the appearance of a
consensual encounter and nonthreatening request to search, can
make it clear to passengers that they would strongly prefer passengers' cooperation.19 ' This understanding, however, only extends
to an officer getting his message across. The question remains: Why
do contraband-transporting passengers "plead guilty" by granting
an officer's request?199 Obedience theory furnishes a model for exploring this question, and more importantly, it helps determine the
point at which a consensual encounter or voluntary consent
becomes the product of impermissible police coercion.
Obedience Theory
Professor Stanley Milgram's famous experiments on obedience to
authority are a valuable vehicle for studying the police-passenger
dynamic during bus sweeps.200 Milgram's experiments and analysis
threatening gestures or connents."Id. Rather than engage in a head-on confrontation with
the Eleventh Circuit by accusing the Washingtonmajority ofcreating a per se rule, the Tenth
Circuit could have distinguished the cases by applying speech act theory. The Tenth Circuit
could have noted that unlike the text-manner disconnect in Washington,in the case at hand
the illocutional component matched the officer's locutional requests and that this particular
bus sweep procedure did not rise to a Fourth Amendment violation. By doing so, the Tenth
Circuit would have avoided determining whether the Eleventh Circuit mandates warnings
during bus sweeps or only strongly prefers them.
Of course, this Note supports Miranda-likewarnings and considers the great importance
given them by the Eleventh Circuit to be in line with the Supreme Courts Bostick standards
and the Courts admonition against per se rules. The lack of any warnings in Broomfield,
therefore, when coupled with the facts that the agent proceeded directly to Broomfield's seat
and began the encounter by displaying his badge, under a Washington analysis, indicated
that Broomfield had been impermissibly "seized" before the agent asked to search his carryon luggage. See id, Absent these secondary factors, however, this bus sweep may have been
allowable under Washington.
198. This is not to suggest that an officer "working the buses" is aware of speech act theory
as such, but through trial and error an officer may develop a knack for elicitingwhat appear
to be voluntary consents, but which the application ofspeech act theory suggests are in fact,
products of coercion. See, e.g., Burton v. United States, 657 A.2d 741, 750 (D.C. 1994)
(Schwelb, A.J., dissenting) ("The detectives who conducted this search were not born
yesterday. They were surely aware that it would not be easy, within the confines of that bus,
for a passenger to defy them and to withhold his consent.").
199. See supra note 157.
200. STANLEY MILORIm, OBEDIENCE To AuTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1969).

Milgram's findings have been applied generally to consent searches, but have not been
explored in the unique context of consent searches conducted during bus sweeps. See Oliver,

408

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:365

help to flesh out the Bostick test that requires courts to "consider all
the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether
the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person
that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or
otherwise terminate the encounter." °1 The circumstances combined
by the Eleventh Circuit to determine that the on-bus encounters in
Guapiand Washington amounted to Fourth Amendment violations
can be best understood as real-world applications of Milgram's
analysis.
In Milgram's experiments, the subject would be instructed to
deliver ever-stronger electrical shocks to a hidden shill "victim"
every time the shill incorrectly answered a question posed by the
subject. 2 As the voltage supposedly was raised, the "victim"
reacted with an increasingly intense series of protests ranging from
minor grunts of discomfort to agonizing screams and pleas to stop,
and the experiments continued past the point at which the "victim"
no longer responded. 3 Whenever a subject would turn to the
experimenter for guidance, the experimenter would reply with one
of a series of scripted "prods" to continue, each more strongly
worded than the last. 0 4 Contrary to predictions by several
groups that "virtually all subjects [would] refuse to obey the
experimenter,"2"' the principle finding was "the extreme willingness
of adults to go to almost any lengths on the command of an
authority," regardless of the ramifications.20 6 That the subjects
continued to shock the shills at the prompting of the experimenters
even though it apparently inflicted great pain may explain why bus
passengers obey authority by "consenting" to a search when doing
so will undoubtedly reveal narcotics and will likely result in stiff
penalties. 2" Though the police do not use overt verbal prods to
supra note 38, at 1465-67; Barrio, supra note 155, at 233-38.
201. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439.
202. MILGRAM, supra note 200, at 17-20.
203. Id. at 23.
204. Id. at 21.
205. Id at 31. The groups polled included psychiatrists, undergraduate and graduate
students, faculty, and middle-class adults. Id. at 30-31.
206. Id. at 5.
207. See SamuelL. Gaertner, SituationalDeterminantsofHurtingandHelpingBehavior,
in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 111, 119 (Bernard Seidenberg & Alvin M.

Snadowsky eds., 1976) ("The parallels between Milgram's research and real-life events are
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coerce bus passengers to consent to a search, a request made by an
authority may have the force of a demand, or "prod."2 8' Given the
apparent difficulty for many citizens to defy authority, a Mirandalike warning to a passenger that he can either refuse the initial
encounter with police or deny the search request may help defuse
the potential for coercion produced by a request made by a
legitimate authority in the confined space of a bus." 9 Specific
warnings informing a passenger of his rights would offer him a
choice other than either exposing his luggage to a search or coming
under increased police scrutiny for denying the officer's requests.
Milgram noted that in the hierarchical structures people use to
organize society, "authority [is] mediated by symbols."210 The
Schneckloth Court attempted to differentiate between consent
searches granted voluntarily from those "coerced ... or granted in

submission to a claim of lawful authority"21 ' and the Supreme Court
in Bostick noted the coercive effect of officers who mount buses
"displaying badges, weapons or other indicia of authority."2 The
disturbinglytangible. Apparently, in some situations, many normal, decentpeople faced with
the commands of legitimate authority tend to obey, regardless of the content of the act.").
The Eleventh Circuit opinions do not contain the punishments imposed by the district courts
in their recent bus-sweep cases, but other circuits have noted the prison sentences imposed
on drug-transporting bus passengers underthe Federal Sentencing Guidelines. United States
v. Stephens, 206 F.3d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting the district court sentence of 240
months in prison for possession with intent to distribute charge); United States v. McDonald,
100 F.3d 1320,1324 (7th Cir. 1996) (120 months in prison plus five years probation and a fine
for same offense).
208. Tracey Maclin, The Declineof the Right ofLocomotion. The FourthAmendment on
the Streets, 75 CoRNELL L. REv. 1258, 1299 n.198 (1990) ("The so-called difference between
a police 'request' and 'demand' is another example of the 'vordsmanship' police departments
have become so adept at in describing their investigatory activities.") (citing Yale Kamisar,
Book Review, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1502, 1503 (1963)).
209. See ULLIVER, supra note 182, at 80-81 ("Commonly ... police invoke the myth of
consent-the idea that a suspect waives his rights ifhe doesn't actively assert them-to justify
their exercise of authority over the liberty of some person who is not independently
motivated to cooperate.").
210. MILGRAM, supranote 200, at 123.
211. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233 (1973).
212. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,441 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at
434 (quoting approvingly the Court's determination in Terry that a seizure can result from
a"show of authority"); Leonard Bickman, The Social Powerof a Uniform, 4 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 47, 47, 58-59 (1974) (declaring that a uniform is a recognized symbol of authority
carrying "a degree of legitimacy" and positing that it is "highly probable that uniformed
governmental authorities have even more legitimate social power [than uniformed private
actors] ... to manipulate citizens").
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Eleventh Circuit made similar observations in its recent bus-sweep
opinions. In Washington, the court found a "show of authority"
when the police officer held his badge over his head while
announcing himself;2 and the Guapi court noted that at the onset
of the bus sweep the "bus driver exit[ed] and [was] replaced by a
uniformed police officer."21 These symbols set the groundwork for
coerced consents in two ways. First, they identify the agent as an
established authority figure. Second, they confront passengers with
a salient reminder that the agent has the authority to take a
passenger's liberty. 5
The Eleventh Circuit found it significant in both Guapi and
Washington that the bus driver disembarked before the bus sweep
commenced, leaving the officers without a competing authority
figure"' and focusing passengers' natural obedience to authority
onto the agents. 217 The Guapi panel explicitly addressed this issue
213. United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354, 1357 (11th Cir. 1998).
214. United States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393, 1396 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).
215. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233-34 (collecting cases in which the Court had
invalidated searches on finding that the consent was "coerced by threats or force"); see also
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion) (noting that the burden is on
the government to prove that a consent to search was voluntarily given, "a burden that is not
satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority").
216. Washington, 151 F.3d at 1355 (noting that the bus driver remained in the terminal
while the officers conducted the bus sweep); Guapi,144 F.3d at 1396 (same); see also United
States v. Stephens, 206 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that the officers' use of the onbus public address system conveyed their authority to the passengers).
217. See MILGRAM, supra note 200, at 138-40. Milgram explains that people expect
structured situations to include a controlling authority figure. See id. at 139. On intercity
buses, the driver is the usual uniformed controlling figure who, by their acquiescence, cede
authority to uniformed drug interdiction agents. See id. at 139-40 (discussing uniforms as
"external accouterments" of authority and explaining that the absence of competing
authorities serves to reinforce that the person claiming authority in a given situation "is the
right man").
Milgram tracks obedience to authority from our earliest inculcation in the family setting,
through institutions such as schools orjob markets, and he notes the rewards society bestows
on those who work within societal frameworks; that is, society rewards those who obey
authority. See id. at 135-38. One may argue that drug couriers by definition are lawbreakers
who operate outside of societal frameworks and are therefore unlikely to obey authority.
Drug couriers, however, are people who engage in one type of (arguably) victimless crime,
but who are likely otherwise societal conformists, or by association, "authority obeyers." For
an individual arrested during a bus sweep, for instance, apart from carrying contraband, he
also bought a ticket, carried government-issued identification, remained nondisruptive
during the journey, etc. In other words, by operating within the societal framework, he
obeyed authority. In this light, then, it may not be so surprising that such a passenger would
obey authority and "consent" to a search "request" from police.
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by remarking that while the police made their initial announcement, the bus driver, "Braggs-the only other potential figure of
authority--exited

the bus."218 Likewise, whereas

Milgram's

experimenters were not backed by the force of law and yet managed
to induce sixty-five percent of subjects to deliver the maximum
shock, 219 police officers are endowed with the coercive power of

arrest, and may wield that legitimate authority in exacting
obedience to conduct searches predicated on a citizen's "consent.""0
Apart from suggesting that people are predisposed to obey
authority in general, perhaps more pronounced when the authority
is in the form of a narcotics agent displaying the trappings of his
office, the Milgram studies also suggest that the situation or context
of an interaction exerts a powerful influence on the level of
obedience to authority. 221' Relative to the distinction drawn in
Schneckloth between the inherently coercive environment surrounding custodial interrogations and noncustodial search requests
determined to be less susceptible to coercion, one can infer from the
obedience studies that the bus setting can be leveraged by police to
induce "consent."" The confines of the bus coupled with ques218. Guapi, 144 F.3d at 1396.
219. MILGRAM, supra note 200, at 33.
220. See, e.g., id. at 93, 96-97 (finding that when the experimenter was presented as an
"ordinary man" rather than as an "authoritative source," subjects were much less obedient);
Thomas Blass, UnderstandingBehavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The Role of
Personality,Situations,and TheirInteractions,60J.PERsoNALrrY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 398,399,
409 (confirming through later studies that the social arrangement between the authority
figure and the subject can determine the level of obedience and that overall "people are much
more prone to obey the orders of a legitimate authority"); see also Maclin, supranote 207, at
1337 n.215 (reviewing other commentators on the subject and concluding that "because the
officer manifests the authority and power of the state, it isno surprise that the citizen
readily complies with the requests of the officer").
221. See MILGRAM, supra note 200, at 149-152; Blass, supra note 220, at 399-402;
Gaertner, supra note 207, at 112 (collecting studies and concluding that situational factors
are stronger determinants of behavior than personality variables).
222. Professor Milgram found that the nearness of the authority to the subject had a
significant positive effect on the obedience of the subject to the authority's verbal prods.
MILGRA3, supranote 200, at 59-62. Later research isolated the proximityvariable from overt
coercion on the part of the experimenter and found "proximity ...
to the legitimate authority
significantly affects the performance of a nonhostile attack initiated by the command of
legitimate authority." Gaertner, supra note 207, at 118. The confines of a bus during a drug
sweep necessitate that police be in close proximity to passengers whenmakingthe individual
requests to consent to a search. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 446 (1991)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (highlightingthe factthat Bostickwas in the rearmost seat andthe
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tioning from an authority figure advance along the continuum
toward the custodial interrogation pole and thus should require
Miranda-likewarnings to be delivered upon boarding and as part
of the consent to search request. The Supreme Court in Bostick
found it "particularly worth noting ... [that] the police specifically

advised Bostick that he had the right to refuse consent." s No
such warning was given in either Guapi or Washington.2 "' The
Washington panel, though it explicitly followed the Supreme Court's
dictate against per se rules in the Fourth Amendment context,'
was especially clear that it viewed the combination of an on-bus
encounter with an absence of warnings
as a presumptive indication
226
of a Fourth Amendment violation.
A telling feature of Milgram's obedience experiments is their
graduated nature. The initial shocks delivered by the subjects were
mild, as were the verbal "prods" of the experimenter.' As the
experiments progressed, the shocks increased in intensity as did the
feedback from the experimenter when the subject began showing
officers were near enough that they partially blocked the aisle). Some officers conducting bus
sweeps have closed the distance between themselves and passengers to an even greater
degree than necessitated by the confines of the bus. United States v. Hill, 199 F.3d 1143,
1146 (10th Cir. 1999) (officer testifying that even though the aisle was only three and one
half feet wide, he would lean in to the seats as he questioned passengers); United States v.
Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting in companion cases the routine police
practice of leaning over passengers to question them, so that even though the officer stood
behind the passenger, the passenger would have to brush against the officer in order to leave
the seat); see also LaFave, supra note 16, at 750 (noting that even if police do not block the
aisle, thus not technically prohibiting a passenger's freedom to leave, the situation is
nonetheless coercive because the passenger is still within arm's length of the officer). Also,
the coercive pressure exerted by the overwhelming authority of the officers may be
exacerbated by their vertical superiority over seated passengers. See Brief Amici Curiae of
the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 5, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (No.
89-1717) (["The drug interdiction officers] stand in or partly in the narrow aisles, towering
over the seated passenger.").
223. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 432.
224. Washington, 151 F.3d at 1356-57 (comparing the lack of notification to passengers
that they had a right to refuse consent in Guapi and the instant case with earlier Eleventh
Circuit bus sweep cases in which such a warning was given and no Fourth Amendment
violation was found).
225. See id. at 1357 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 43537).
226. Washington, 151 F.3d at 1357 ("Looking atthe circumstances ofthis case, we feel that
a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have felt free to disregard [the
officer's] requests without some positive indication that consent could have been refused.").
227. MILGRAM, supranote 200, at 17-22.
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signs of doubt about continuing.22 This stepwise progression
solidified the subject's state of complicity with the experimenter and
made it more difficult for the subject to justify breaking off his
obedience. 229 Likewise, the officers conducting the bus sweeps in
Bostick and Washington asked to check the passengers' tickets and
identification before requesting consent to search carry-on
luggage. 23 0 A passenger who initially accedes to engage in a
seemingly innocuous consensual encounter with police, and then
complies with a request to show his ticket and identification, must
then shift gears if he is to deny permission for police to conduct a
search of his luggage, thereby breaking from the role of compliant
passenger 23 1 and possibly raising the suspicions of the officers. 2
The difficulty of asserting an unwillingness to continue granting
gradually more intrusive requests by legitimately authoritative
officers goes to the core lesson of Milgram's experiments-that
228. Id.
229. Id. at 149; Ross, supra note 170, at 102-03 (explaining the "psychological dilemma"
faced by the subject in stopping the experiment midway because in doing so he would have
to justify "how it could be illegitimate to deliver the next shock but legitimate to have
delivered one of only slightly lesser magnitude moments before").
230. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431-32; Washington, 151 F.3d at 1356. Posing informal questions
and asking to see identification prior to requesting to search a passenger's carry-on luggage
appears to be a standard bus sweep operating procedure. See, e.g., United States v. Smith,
201 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000).
231. See MILGRAM, supra note 200, at 162.64 (summarizingthepsychologicalmechanisms
subjects use to justify their continued complicity and explaining the many psychological
barriers a subject must overcome to disobey); see also United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp.
784, 788 (D.D.C. 1990), reo'd, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (describing an "increasingly
more intrusive" series of questions directed at a bus passenger as raising the passenger's
level of "anxiety and duress" and concluding that "most citizens ... cannot, given the
circumstances, say 'No' or otherwise refuse to comply with a police officer's request").
232. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text; LaFave, supra note 16, at 751
(positing that bus passengers are unlikely to refuse an initial engagement with officers
because a "reasonable person would perceive such stonewalling as a course which would
make him an object of suspicion and thus a subject of further attention by the police team
involved in the sweep"); Maclin, supra note 42, at 810 (concluding that because it is
"unrealistic" to think bus passengers have any control over a bus sweep, it is unrealistic to
think they would feel "free to terminate the encounter or to decline the officer's requests").
Though it is a passenger's right to withdraw or place limits on their grant of consent to
search, it is unlikely that they will do so. See Burton v. United States, 657 A.2d 741, 751
(D.C. 1994) (Schwelb, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority for ignoring the actions ofa bus
passenger indicating a withdrawal of consent to search which "[tlo a lay observer ... would
surely come across as an action designed to thwart a search"); Kagehiro, supranote 157, at
45 (finding that only 43% of the subjects understood that one who consents to a search can
place limits on its scope).
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"relatively few people have the resources needed to resist
authority."23 In joining Washington, the Ninth Circuit in Stephens
echoed this lesson by concluding that "no passenger, innocent or
guilty, would have felt free to refuse to answer the officers'
questions while remaining on the bus."" 4
To refuse the search requests of a police officer in an open
environment in itself would constitute a break from the norm 5
and, accordingly, many people consent to police searches . 3 6 It is
clear fromRoyer thatMiranda-likewarnings are not required when
police approach citizens in open settings,2 7 and though it is a factor
to be considered in the "totality of the circumstances" test of
voluntariness, police are not required to warn citizens of their
constitutional rights before requesting consent to searchY To
refuse a search request in the close confines of a bus with seemingly
no escape,219 while the vast majority of your fellow passengers are
233. MILGRAM, supra note 200, at 6. Milgram's experiments were intended to investigate
the psychological bases of German citizens' complicity in the Nazi extermination ofJews. Id.
at 2; see also Ross, supranote 170, at 103 ("[Mlany subjects ... were obedient to the bitter end
because they didn't really know how to disobey effectively, that is, exactly what one had to
say or do to terminate the experiment....").
234. United States v. Stephens, 206 F.3d 914, 917 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000).
235. United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354, 1357 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting in dicta
that "[miost citizens, we hope, believe that it is their duty to cooperate with the police");
William J. Stuntz, Terry's Impossibility, 72 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 1213, 1215 (1998) (arguing

that "ordinary people never feel free to terminate a conversation with a police officer").
236. See RICHARDVANDUIZEND ETAL., THE SEARCHWARRANTPROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS,
PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 19 (1985) (finding that most searches are premised on consent or

are conducted incident to arrest and noting that one officer interviewed suggested that
consent searches accounted for up to 98%ofthe searches he conducted); Daniel L. Rotenberg,
An Essay on Consent(less)Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 190 (1991) (noting that
even police are surprised at the level of compliance by citizens and that 'judging from the
numerous appellate cases upholding consent searches, their use generally is quite frequent").
237. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983).
238. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,248-49 (1973).
239. See Floridav. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,448 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (indicating
that a passenger would not want to exit a bus during a sweep for fear of being stranded at
the bus station); Stephens, 206 F.3d at 916 (suggesting that the officers boarded the bus at
its scheduled departure time in order to heighten the coerciveness ofthe bus sweep); LaFave,
supra note 16, at 749 (proposing that "the police dominance manifested in a bus sweep has
a profound impact upon bus travelers because they, unlike pedestrians or travelers
confronted in an airline terminal, have limited means for avoiding or ending the contact").
The inability of bus passengers to retreat from questioning officers may add to their
perceived pressure to obey. See Cheryl A. Albas & Daniel C. Albas, Meaningin Context: The
Impact ofEye ContactandPerceptionof Threat on Proximity, 129 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 525, 530
(1989) (finding that subjects stood farther away from experimenters in situations where the
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cooperating,"0 is especially difficult. Professor Milgram and his
adherents likely would agree that buses present a situation
uniquely susceptible to subtle police manipulations which lead to
consents to search based more on obedience to authority than true
voluntariness. 1 The Eleventh Circuit has rightly determined that
the Constitution demands that bus sweeps include prophylactic
warnings, the absence of which creates a presumption of coercion

which, if not rebutted, taints the consent and renders inadmissible
any evidence discovered as a result of a search.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing analyses have endeavored to establish two
premises. First, a standard narcotics bus sweep poses very close
Fourth Amendment questions. Appellate courts at every level have

wrestled with slight variations of the tactic. In addition to the
federal circuit court split between the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits

subjects felt threatened); Michael J. Strube & Carol Werner, InterpersonalDistance and
PersonalSpace:A Conceptualand MethodologicalNote,6(3) J. NONVERBAL BEHAV. 163, 168
(1982) (finding that "both interpersonal distance and personal space were increased by
subjects who anticipated that the other person would attempt to control them during the
interaction").
240. See United Statesv. Felder, 732 F. Supp. 204,205 (D.D.C. 1990) (noting the arresting
officer's testimony that "only 3 or 4" out of eighty-five passengers refused to consent to an
interview); Stubbs v. State, 661 So. 2d 1268, 1269 (5th Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (recording
the testimony of an officer who claimed most passengers would grant her permission to
search); State v. Kerwick, 512 So. 2d 347, 349 (4th Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that one
officer, "in the name of 'voluntary cooperation' with law enforcement ... had searched in
excess of three thousand bags" in a nine-month period); see also MILGRAM, supra note 200,
at 113-22 (describing conformity and obedience as 'abdication[s] of initiative to an external
source").
241. M=GRAM, supranote 200, at 205 ("[O]ften, itis not so much the kind of person a man
is as the kind of situation in which he finds himself that determines how he will act."); Ross,
supra note 170, at 103:
What the Milgram experiments offered was an unparalleled demonstration of
the degree to which it is specific, often subtle, details of the situation that
matter most and yet go unnoticed and unappreciated. Milgram's
demonstrations challenge us to look at the situation closely, taking care to
appreciate the subjective viewpoint of the actor, especially when we must try
to explain behavior that seems inexplicable.
Id.; see also Blass, supra note 220, at 399 ("There is no question that modifications in the
physical ... arrangements in the setting of the obedience experiment can have powerful
effects.").
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on one side and the Tenth Circuit on the other,242 the uncertain
constitutionality of bus sweeps has resulted in a perverse situation
in Florida, the state where bus sweeps were developed.' As it
stands, if a narcotics-transporting passenger is caught during a
routine bus sweep in Florida, the contraband seized (usually the
only tangible evidence brought out in trial) will be admitted in state
court, but suppressed in the encompassing federal court.244 This
situation is antithetical to the founding principle that the federal
Constitution sets the threshold of the individual liberty protections
that states must secure for citizens, although states are encouraged
to grant broader protections.2' 5 Second, police-initiated encounters
and attendant search requests conducted in the close confines of a
bus engender psychological pressures on passengers to comply and
can result in grants of consent to search that are not voluntarily
given, but are in fact the product of police coercion." 6 In 1998, the
Eleventh Circuit recognized the circumstances of the paradigmic
bus sweep as a situation police could leverage to force encounters
onto unwilling citizens and elicit consents to search of questionable
voluntariness. The court moved to remedy this imbalance by wisely
adopting the view that bus sweeps conducted without Mirandalike warnings informing passengers that they could decline the
initial encounter and refuse to consent to a search would give rise
to a presumption that the bus sweep in question violated the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Dennis J. Callahan

242. See supra notes 125-42 and accompanying text. A defendant in the Fourth Circuit
cited Washington in an effort to suppress the narcotics seized during a bus sweep, but the
claim was summarily dismissed as distinguishable on the facts ofthe case. United States v.
Whitfield, No. 99-4316, 1999 U.S. App. LI S 23331 (4th Cir. Sept. 24, 1999) (per curiam).
243. See supra note 43.
244. CompareUnited States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393 (11th Cir. 1998) with Mondestin v.
State, 760 So. 2d 1062, 1063 (4th Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam) (rejecting the
defendant's argument that Guapi required that the officers inform citizens of their rights
before conducting a bus sweep and concluding: "We recognize that this is not the appropriate
court to reexamine Bostick.").
245. See supra note 52.
246. See supra notes 143-241 and accompanying text.

